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The empirical evidence on rational inattention lags far behind the theoretical developments: micro
evidence on the most immediate consequence of observation costs ￿ the infrequent observation of state
variables ￿ is not available in standard datasets. We contribute to ￿lling the gap with two novel household
surveys that record the frequency with which investors observe the value of their ￿nancial investments,
as well as the frequency with which they trade in ￿nancial assets and durable goods. We use these data
to test some predictions of existing models and show that to match the patterns in the data we need
to modify these models by shifting the focus from non-durable to durable consumption. The model
we develop features both observation and transaction costs and implies a mixture of time-dependent
and state-dependent rules, where the importance of each rule depends on the ratio of the observation
to the transaction cost. Numerical simulations show that the model can produce frequency of portfolio
observations and asset trading comparable to that of the median investor (about 4 and 0.4 per year,
respectively) with small observation costs (about 1 basis point of ￿nancial wealth) and larger transaction
costs (about 30 basis points of ￿nancial wealth). In spite of its small size the observation cost gives
rise to infrequent information gathering (between monthly and quarterly). A quantitative assessment
of the relevance of the observation costs shows that the behavior of investors is essentially unchanged
compared to the one produced by a model with transaction but no observation cost. We test a novel
prediction of the model on the relationship between assets trades and durable-goods trades and ￿nd
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A large literature documents that several economic decisions occur infrequently.1 For in-
stance, individual investors adjust their portfolios sporadically even though the prices of
many assets experience large ﬂuctuations at high frequency. Similarly, ﬁrms do not reset the
price every time their input costs change. These infrequent adjustments at the micro level
are a potential source of sluggish behavior at the aggregate level and have thus attracted the
interest of macroeconomists. One hypothesis that has received attention in the recent litera-
ture is that inaction might result from the presence of observation costs, i.e. costs related to
the information gathering process, such as those due to the monitoring of the value of equity
(in the case of a consumer/ investor) or the monitoring of production costs (in the case of a
ﬁrm). The optimality of economizing attention when information gathering is costly is what
we refer to as the “rational inattention” hypothesis.2
Besides the intuitive appeal of observation costs, an important methodological reason
that makes it interesting is that the nature of the optimal adjustments implied by this fric-
tion is diﬀerent from the one generated by standard ﬁxed cost, and this translates into
diﬀerent implications for aggregate behavior. Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and Laibson
(2001), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007) show that with observation costs the optimal rule
implies time-dependent adjustments, as opposed to state-dependent adjustments that are
typical in the standard ﬁxed-cost literature. Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2009) show that
a time-dependent rule may be optimal even in an environment with both observation and
transactions costs. Understanding the nature of the decision rule matters because the aggre-
gation of agents following time-dependent rules is diﬀerent from the one of agents following
state-dependent rules as argued by Gabaix and Laibson (2001) and Alvarez, Atkeson, and
Edmond (2003) in the consumption-savings and price-setting literature, respectively. Finally,
the modeling of inattentive investors, whose active participation in markets is only sporadic,
may be important to understand the dynamics of assets prices, as argued by Duﬃe (2010).
In spite of the theoretical developments that rational inattention has inspired, micro
evidence on rational inattention lags behind. Empirical evidence on the most immediate
consequence of observation costs − the infrequent observation of state variables − is not
available in standard datasets. We contribute to ﬁlling the gap with two novel household
surveys that record the frequency with which individuals observe the value of their ﬁnancial
1See Stokey (2008) for a survey of the recent literature.
2Two broad areas where this hypothesis is studied are the consumption, savings, and portfolio theory
(see e.g. Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and Laibson (2001), Sims (2003) and Reis (2006a), Abel, Eberly,
and Panageas (2007) and price setting problems (see e.g. Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Woodford (2008)).
Our use of the term ”rational inatenttion” is broader than as seminally proposed by Sims, and follows more
closely the use by Reis and Abel et all.
1investments, as well as the frequency with which they trade assets and durable goods. We
use these data to test key predictions of existing rational inattention models and to quantify
the relative importance of the observation cost relative to standard transactions costs. We
ﬁnd that to match important patterns in the data and to distinguish between between both
types of cost we need to introduce a new model that shifts the focus from non-durable to
durable consumption. The model we develop implies a mixture of time-dependent and state-
dependent rules, where the importance of each rule depends on the relative magnitude of the
observation and transaction costs.
Our starting point are the models developed by Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and
Laibson (2001), Reis (2006a), and Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007, 2009). These seminal
contributions explore the consequences of observation costs in the context of a household
optimal savings problem that includes the optimal management of a low return liquid asset,
required to pay for transactions, analogous to the monetary models with a cash in advance
constraint. Section 2 reviews these models and their predictions for the patterns of non-
durable consumption, trade in ﬁnancial assets (purchase or liquidation of assets), information
collection about the ﬁnancial portfolio and liquid asset holdings.
In Section 3 we introduce two original datasets that are tailor-made to provide detailed
evidence on these patterns. We ﬁnd a robust pattern consistent with the assumption that an
important component of adjustment costs is information gathering, namely that the frequency
of trading, the frequency of observation and the time spent collecting ﬁnancial information are
strongly correlated across investors. However, we ﬁnd no evidence supporting two important
mechanisms operating in these models. In particular, the models of Duﬃe and Sun (1990),
Gabaix and Laibson (2001), and Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007, 2009) predict that the
observed frequency of observation and ﬁnancial transactions should coincide, and also predict
that the household liquidity (e.g. the average M1 or M2 balances) should decrease with the
frequency of trades in assets. Our analysis shows that both predictions are poorly born
out in the data: the frequency of information acquisition is at least 3 times larger than the
frequency of portfolio trades. Moreover, the data shows little or no evidence of a negative
link between the household liquidity and the frequency of asset trades.
In Section 4 we develop a new model that overcomes these two empirical shortcomings
while preserving a central role for the cost of observation. We depart from the previous
literature by focusing on durable, as opposed to non-durable, consumption goods. This
shift has two important consequences. First in the model with durable consumption the
agent optimally chooses to hold no liquid asset just until the day of the purchase, even
if transactions are subject to be paid using a liquid asset. This is because durable goods
purchases are infrequent and can thus be made so as to coincide with assets trades. Hence
2the average holdings of liquid assets is unrelated to the frequency of assets trades, consistent
with the patterns observed in the data.3 Second, in the model with durable consumption with
both observation and transactions costs, the observation frequency is larger than the trading
frequency, as in the data. The reason for this result is that durable goods and transactions
costs give rise to an inaction region, just like in Grossman and Laroque (1990) and Stokey
(2009), where the agent tolerates moderate deviations of the durable goods stock from the
frictionless benchmark. Thus, every time the agent observes her wealth and ﬁnds it to be in
the inaction region the model produces an observation without a trade.
In Section 5 we use numerical simulations of the model to gauge the order of magnitude
of observation and transactions costs that are consistent with observed investors’ behavior.
This exercise shows that very small observation costs are suﬃcient to reproduce the frequency
of observation that is found in the data. Section 6 tests two novel predictions of the durable
good model. First, that the frequencies of assets transactions and that of durable adjustment
should be related. Second, that since more risk tolerant individuals invest more in volatile
assets, they value information more and thus observe more frequently. The data lend support
to both predictions.
Section 7 concludes with a discussion of our quantitative ﬁndings, and a comparison with
the ﬁndings in Alvarez, Lippi, and Paciello (2009) on ﬁrms’ price setting behavior in a model
with observation and menu costs. We also discuss the role of labor income, an ingredient that
is absent in the literature on which we build this paper, the possibility that some portfolio
observations are available at no cost, and other issues for future research.
2 Inattention, Liquidity and Non-Durable Goods
This section reviews a class of models that use the rational inattention hypothesis to study
consumption, savings, portfolio theory and liquidity. In these models the relevant decisions
concern the rate of consumption - or savings - and the portfolio composition; the costs are
those associated with keeping track of the information about ﬁnancial variables. Examples
of these models are Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and Laibson (2001), Sims (2005), Reis
(2006a), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007, 2009) among others.
We describe a version of the rational inattention model of Abel, Eberly, and Panageas
(2009). Households maximize discounted expected utility derived from the consumption of
non-durables c and period utility u(c) = c1−γ/(1−γ), with CRRA coeﬃcient γ, and discount
3An example is the purchase of a house, which occurs infrequently and is typically paid for with the
proceeds of a sale of a ﬁnancial asset executed immediately before the house purchase, as opposed to being
paid with balances accumulated in a transaction account with a low yield. Once the date of purchase is
decided, it is optimal to liquidate the high-yield investments in the proximity of the house purchase.
3rate ρ. The purchases of non-durable goods are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint
(CIA): agents must pay with resources drawn form a liquid asset account, with real value
denoted by m. Non-negative liquid assets represent a broad monetary aggregate, such as
M2, and have a low real return rL. The agent’s source for the liquid asset is her ﬁnancial
wealth a, a fraction α of which is invested in risky assets and the remaining in risk-less bonds.
The risk-less bond yields r > rL, and the risky asset has continuously compounded normally
distributed return, with instantaneous mean µ and variance σ2 (the portfolio is assumed to
be managed so that it stays continuously rebalanced with fraction α of risky asset). There
is a ﬁxed cost φo of observing the value of the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth and a ﬁxed cost φT of
changing α and transferring resources between the investment and the liquid assets accounts.
From now on we call observation the agent’s act of observing the value of the her ﬁnancial
wealth, and trade the agent’s act of adjusting the portfolio. We assume that the costs are
ﬁxed, in the sense that they are incurred regardless of the size of the adjustment, but they
are proportional to the current value of the stock variable a. This speciﬁcation, which is
standard in the literature - see for example Grossman and Laroque (1990) and Abel, Eberly,
and Panageas (2007) - is adopted for convenience, since it preserves the homogeneity of the
value function, and hence reduces the dimensionality of the problem. We remark that the
models of Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and Laibson (2001), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas
(2007) are obtained as a special case of this model by setting the trade cost φT = 0.
We denote by V (a,m) the value of the problem for an agent with current liquid assets m,
who has just paid the observation cost discovering that her ﬁnancial wealth is a. She must
decide whether to pay the cost φT, choose α and transfer some resources to/from the liquid
account, as well as τ, the length of the time period until the new observation of her ﬁnancial
assets. The budget constraint at the time of observation is
a
′ + m
′ + a φT Im′ =m = a + m (1)
where I{ } is an indicator of transfers. Letting N(s) be the CDF of a standard normal, and
R(s,τ,α) be the gross return during τ period with portfolio α when the innovation to the






This is the gross return to a portfolio that is continuously rebalanced to have fraction α in
the risky asset with instantaneous return with mean µ and variance σ2 per unit of time, i.e.
1
τ
E[R(s,τ,α) − 1] → αµ + (1 − α)r ,
1
τ
Var[R(s,τ,α) − 1] → α
2σ
2 . (3)
4Then the value function solves:










′(1 − φo)R(s,τ,α), m(τ))dN(s)
subject to the budget constraint (1) at the time of the adjustment, and to the liquid asset-
in-advance constraint between adjustment:
dm(t)/dt = rLm(t) − c(t) , m(0) = m
′, m(t) ≥ 0, for t ∈ [0,τ]. (4)
An interesting result common to the models of Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and Laibson
(2001), and Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007, 2009) is that trades and observations coincide.
In particular, consider an agent with m = 0, so at this time she must observe and trade.
Then she would choose a transfer m′(0) > 0 from her ﬁnancial asset to her liquid asset, a
future observation date ¯ τ, a portfolio share α, and path of consumption between adjustments
c(·), with the property that m(¯ τ) = 0, i.e. she is planning to run out of liquid asset just
at the next observation date. In other words, starting from a state of zero liquid asset, the
agent will observe at deterministic equally spaced intervals of length ¯ τ, and every time she
observes the value of her ﬁnancial assets she will transfer resources to her liquid account.
Figure 1: Simulated Path of Financial Asset a(t) and Liquid Assets m(t)
















































The nature of the optimal policy is illustrated in Figure 1, which displays the values
5for the ﬁnancial asset and liquid asset in a simulation for an agent following the optimal
policy. Notice that the liquid asset m(t) follows a saw-tooth path familiar from the inventory
models, such as Baumol-Tobin’s classic problem, with withdrawals (and observations) at
equally spaced time periods: 0, ¯ τ, 2 ¯ τ, etc. One diﬀerence compared to Baumol and Tobin
is that the value of the withdrawal (the vertical jumps up in m(t), and down for a(t) in
Figure 1), and hence the rate of consumption between successive withdrawals, depends on
the level of the ﬁnancial assets that the agent observes just before the withdrawal.4 We stress
that in this model following the optimal policy implies that every observation coincides with
a trade. Also notice, for future reference, that the homogeneity of the problem implies that
after an observation and trade, the agent sets the same ratio m(0)/a(0) ≡ ¯ m.
The saw-tooth pattern of liquid asset holdings displayed in the ﬁgure makes clear that the
model predicts a negative correlation between the average liquidity (scaled by non durable
consumption) and the number of transactions (e.g. liquidity transfers), as in the standard
inventory model of cash holdings.5 For instance, in the Baumol-Tobin deterministic model the
average liquid balance equals half of the liquidity transfer. Together with the identity positing
that the product of the number of transactions (n) times the average liquidity transfer (2 m)
is equal to the ﬂow of expenditure over a given time period (c), gives us M/c = 1/(2 n). This
implies that the log correlation between M/c and the frequency of transactions is −1. This
same prediction holds in this model and can be tested empirically, as we do in Section 3.4.6
Interestingly Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2009) show that the synchronization between
observation and trading holds not only when the cost of transferring resources from ﬁnancial
asset to liquid asset is zero, i.e. when φT = 0, but also for φT > 0, provided that this cost is
not too large. For the case when φT > 0 this is a surprising result. To see that, notice that
it implies that the following deviation is not optimal. Increase the amount of liquid asset
withdrawn m(0), keep the same consumption proﬁle, pay the observation cost, and learn
the value of the ﬁnancial assets at the scheduled time ¯ τ. Note that by construction in the
deviation m(¯ τ) > 0. At this time consider following a sS type policy: if the ratio m(¯ τ)/a(¯ τ)
is similar to what it would have been after a withdrawal (given by ¯ m), then do not trade. If
the ratio is small enough, then pay the trade cost φT, trade, and set the ratio m(0)/a(0) equal
to ¯ m. This deviation has the advantage of saving the ﬁxed trading cost φT with a strictly
positive probability (i.e. the probability that m(¯ τ)/a(¯ τ) is large). It has the disadvantage
4In the example considered in the ﬁgure, following the model parametrization by Abel, Eberly, and
Panageas (2009), the time variation in the size of withdrawals is small because the variance of the portfolio
return is small relative to its mean trend.
5Unlike the classic currency management problem in Baumol and Tobin, the new models seem more
appropriately applied to broader notions of liquidity, such as M1 or M2.
6 Alvarez and Lippi (2009) show that the negative correlation between m/c and n extends to stochastic
inventory models.
6that it increases the opportunity cost by holding more of the liquid asset. Abel, Eberly, and
Panageas (2009) show that indeed this deviation is not optimal, provided that φT is not too
large. We will return to this when we present our model based on durable goods.
3 Observations, Trades, and Liquidity: Theory vs. Data
The model in the previous section carries very neat implications on at least two potentially
observable - and thus testable - behaviors: ﬁrst, since investors do their best to avoid col-
lecting information when it is not needed, they should keep the frequency of observations
as close as they can to the frequency of ﬁnancial trades. In Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix
and Laibson (2001), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007, 2009) as well as in our version of
their model, the two actually coincide, providing a very strong empirical prediction. Second,
because the combination of a cash in advance constraint and the use of money (only) to
purchase non-durable goods gives rise to a Baumol-Tobin-type management of liquid assets,
investors that trade more frequently should have lower average holdings of liquid assets. In
this section we bring these predictions to bear with a novel set of data that contains informa-
tion on how frequently people choose to observe the value of their ﬁnancial assets and trade
them as well as data on the value and composition of their liquid and ﬁnancial assets.
3.1 Data sources
Our empirical evidence relies on two diﬀerent sources. The ﬁrst is the Unicredit Survey
(UCS), which gathers information on a sample of about 1,800 Italian investors with an
account at Unicredit, one of the largest banking groups in Europe. We base most of the
analysis on the ﬁrst wave, run in 2003 but occasionally we also rely on data from the 2007
wave. The novel and original feature of this survey is the wealth of information that it has
on the frequency people gather information on their ﬁnancial investments and make ﬁnancial
transactions as well as on investors’ risk preferences, assets and demographics which provide
an ideal setting for testing predictions of models that emphasize information and transaction
costs in household savings and ﬁnancial decisions. We complement the UCS survey with the
2004 Survey of Households Income and Wealth - a widely used survey on a sample of about
8,000 Italian households managed by the Bank of Italy. This dataset has two useful features:
ﬁrst, unlike UCS it collects detailed data on durable purchases; this particular wave has also
information on the frequency investors make ﬁnancial trades. Both will prove important in
Section 6 to test the predictions of the model we develop in Section 4. Second, while UCS is
representative of the population of Unicredit customers it is not of the Italian population; but
7SHIW is, and this allows us to make sure that our ﬁndings with UCS are not the reﬂection
of sample selection.
3.2 Key variables description
To avoid cluttering the paper, we provide details about the two surveys and the variables
that we use in the data appendix. Here we describe in some detail two key variables for our
analysis: the frequency investors observe investments and the frequency they trade ﬁnancial
assets.
To our knowledge, UCS is the ﬁrst large scale survey to collect information on how
frequently people check their ﬁnancial investments and make ﬁnancial trades. In the 2003
wave sample participants where asked: “How often do you check the value of your ﬁnancial
investments?”. They could answer: a) every day; b) at least once a weak; c) every 15 days;
d) once a month; e) about every three months; f) about every six months; g) about once in a
year; h) less than once a year i) never check; l) have no investments. To obtain information on
the frequency of ﬁnancial trades they were asked: “How often do you change the composition
of your ﬁnancial portfolio and sell or buy ﬁnancial assets?” The options are: a) every day;
b) at least once a week; c) about every two weeks; d) about every month; e) about every
three months; f) about every six months; g) about every year; h) less than once a year; i) at
maturity; l) never; m) I have no investments.
Similar questions were asked in the 2007 UCS wave while the trade frequency question,
with the same wording, was also asked in the 2004 SHIW. The only diﬀerence with respect
to the UCS question is that the ﬁrst two answers are lumped together as “at least once a
weak”. Obviously, questions only apply to active investors, implying that some observations
(316 in UCS 2003 out of 1,834 participants) will be lost. Next, we use these data to confront
two predictions of the rational inattention model discussed in Section 2.
3.3 Prediction #1: portfolio observations and trades coincide
Table 1 shows the joint distribution of the frequency of observing and that of asset trading
among the 2003 UCS investors. The table documents several noteworthy features. First, the
large mass of observations on the main diagonal of the table shows that there is a strong
positive correlation between the frequency with which agents observe their investments and
the frequency of asset trading: those who observe the portfolio more often also tend to trade
more often. Second, in only a handful of cases (6 percent of the observations) investors trade
more frequently than they observe. These two features are implied by the important notion,
embedded in the model in Section 2, that investors economize on information gathering costs
8Table 1: Frequencies of portfolio observation and trade in UCS 2003
Observations per year:
365 52 26 12 4 2 1 < 1 − never
Trades per year:
365 29 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
52 14 24 2 4 2 0 1 0 0
26 13 18 13 7 1 0 0 0 0
12 16 29 35 65 17 3 1 3 0
4 18 19 24 97 103 6 2 0 2
2 5 20 23 63 84 53 2 0 2
1 9 14 8 37 48 33 16 1 4
< 1 7 17 12 37 41 29 7 24 8
at maturity 11 17 5 48 60 23 27 38 - 13
never 4 4 0 9 15 14 4 12 35
Source: Unicredit survey 2003, All investors. Each entry is the number of household observation
in each cell; Entries on main diagonal highlighted in bold. Summary stats: Fraction on main
diagonal: 24%; Fraction below main diagonal: 70%.
and lend support to some of the mechanisms captured by Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and
Laibson (2001), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007, 2009) theories. The fact that few investors
trade more often than they observe may be due to minor measurement errors (reassuring
about the quality of our indicators of observing and trading frequencies) or reﬂect rare cases
where investors trade blindly.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the frequency of observing and trading for diﬀerent
groups of investors both from the UCS 2003 and the SHIW 2004 surveys. Consistently with
models that stress information gathering costs and assets trading costs, investors observe their
investments and trade assets infrequently. The median number of portfolio observations per
year in the sample of UCS investors (direct and indirect) is 12, while the median number of
asset trades is 2. Smaller frequencies for asset trading are estimated for the investors in the
SHIW (in the lower panel of the Table). The SHIW statistics, computed on a sample that is
representative of the Italian investors, are similar to those observed for US households. For
instance Bonaparte and Cooper (2009), using the Survey of Consumer Finances, report that
the fraction of household owning stocks that adjust their portfolio in one year is 0.7, the same
value that appears for the median stockholder in the SHIW (which corresponds to one trade
every 1.4 years).7 The table also reports an estimate for the median number of observations
7ICI (2005b) reports information on US equity investors. Figure 33 shows that for 1998, 2001 and 2004
the fraction of investors (who own equities) that have made no trades in equity during a year is 0.58, 0.6,
and 0.6 respectively. Assuming a Poisson distributed number of trades with constant intensity this implies
9in the SHIW sample, imputed from a regression estimated on the UCS data (see the note to
the table for more details). The frequency of observation for the equity investor in the SHIW
sample is about 1/2 that for the UCS sample of equity investors.
Table 2: Number of portfolio observations and trades per year
# portfolio observations # portfolio trades Assetsa
mean med. std mean med. std mean med
Unicredit Survey 2003 (UCS)
All investors 42 12 98 14 2 56 252 77
Stockholders 56 12 113 18 2 64 331 120
Stockholders (direct) 66 12 122 22 4 71 367 132
SHIW Survey 2004
All investors 3.6b 2 0.4 7 50 26
Stockholders (direct) 5.4b 3 0.7 7 67 36
Note: The upper panel is based on the Unicredit survey for 2003. All investors (1,518) are indi-
viduals with at least 1,000 euros in bank deposits who also have some other ﬁnancial investments.
This survey is designed to oversample the wealthy. Stockholders (984) includes individuals holding
stocks of listed or unlisted ﬁrms directly, or through a mutual fund, or a managed investment ac-
count. Direct stockholders (736) includes individuals holding stocks of listed or unlisted companies
directly. The lower panel is based on SHIW 2004 survey, that is designed to be representative of
Italian households. It includes 2,808 households with ﬁnancial assets other than bank or postal
account (1,535 of which own stocks directly). See Appendix A for a more detailed description
and comparison of these surveys. −aThousands, in 2003 euros. −bImputed to the SHIW investors
from a regression estimated on the UCS data. The speciﬁcation (in logs) includes the following
regressors: the number of asset trades, the investor’s ﬁnancial assets and controls for the investor
age, gender, education and marital status. The R2 is 0.3 for the UCS full sample and 0.2 for the
UCS sample of stockholders. In each SHIW sample the reported quantity is the median of the
ﬁtted values produced by the estimated regression.
Though this evidence is consistent with the costly observation hypothesis it also departs
from it in one important dimension. Contrary to Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and Laib-
son (2001), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007, 2009), the data show that investors do not
trade every time they observe the value of their investments. Instead, they observe their
investments more often than they trade. The frequency of trading and the frequency of
observation coincide for only 28% of the investors (those along the diagonal in Table 1); for
67% of the investors the observation frequency is higher than the trading frequency. Thus,
only a minority of the investors in the sample conforms to the strong prediction of the model
in Section 2. Table 2 conﬁrms that investors observe the value of their investments more
frequently than they trade, with a ratio between the two average frequencies around 3. This
pattern holds across investors type, asset levels, and trade-frequency.
an average of about 0.51 trades per year.
10We stress that these patterns are unlikely to be the reﬂection of poor measurement (e.g.
of the frequency investors observe their investments) or of some particular feature of the
survey wave. To address the ﬁrst concern, we rely on an independent measure available in
the 2003 UCS of the amount of ﬁnancial information investors collect from various sources
(such as newspapers, the web, their advisors or the companies’ accounting statements) before
making an investment decision. This is a broad measure of the time investors devote to
gathering ﬁnancial information. One would expect that investors who collect more ﬁnancial
information in general, also observe the value of their investments more frequently, and this is
indeed the case as shown in Figure A-8 in Appendix A. Measurement errors could be present
in the frequency of trades. However the ones that may conceivably aﬀect our measure are,
if anything, working to make the positive gap between observing and trading frequency
measured in UCS an underestimate of the theoretically relevant one. In the model trading
means transferring resources from a savings to a liquid account; in the data, given the wording
of the question, some of the trades may involve portfolio re-balancing with no transfers to
or from the liquid account. While we do not have information for Italy about the two type
of trades, survey data on US investors report that in more than 2/3 of times the proceeds
from sales of stocks by households are fully reinvested.8 Taking this into account would
increase the estimated diﬀerence between the frequency of observing the value of investment
and the frequency of trade involving transfers, i.e. would make the prediction of the simple
version of the model of Section 2 even more counterfactual. To address the second concern,
we have reproduced Table 1 using the 2007 UCS. The new joint distribution (not reported)
has the same features as the one based on the 2003 wave: only 3.5% of the investors trade
more frequently than they observe their investments; 24% equally frequently and 72.5% less
frequently while the average number of observations stays in a ratio of 3 to 1 to the number
of trades.
In sum, the joint empirical pattern of the frequency of observing one’s investments and
that of trading suggests that while the models of Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and Laibson
(2001), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007, 2009) capture important features of this pattern,
they fail to predict the systematic tendency of observing frequency to exceed that of trading
frequency - a feature of the data that is unlikely to result from mis-measurement of these key
variables.
8See Figure F.7 “Disposition of Proceeds from most recent sale of individual stocks”, in ICI (2005a).
113.4 Prediction #2: investors who trade more hold less liquidity
If portfolio trades are mostly aimed at transferring resources from the asset account to the
liquid account then those agents who trade more frequently should, on average, hold less
liquid assets. Indeed, the model in Section 2 has an even stronger implication as it predicts
a unitary elasticity between liquid assets holdings (scaled by non durable consumption) and
the number of ﬁnancial trades.
Figure 2: Household Liquidity vs. asset trade frequency
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Note: Log scale. Liquidity is measured by the ratio M/c, where M is M2 (similar results obtained
for M1) and c is non-durable consumption (same results if total consumption is used); in the
Unicredit survey consumption is imputed from a regression in the SHIW data using income and
other demographics. For each trade frequency bin, the ﬁgure plots the mean of M/c (dots denote
the standard deviation of the mean statistic) and the model predicted relation, given by M/c =
1/(2 · trading freq.).
We test this prediction using both UCS data and SHIW data. Liquid assets are deﬁned
as the sum of cash holdings, checking and savings accounts - a measure close to M2 - but
results are unaﬀected if we use a narrower deﬁnition that includes only cash and checking
accounts. Since UCS collects no consumption data we impute it using the 2004 SHIW to
estimate non-durable consumptions (see Appendix A for details). We then construct the
ratio between liquid assets and consumption. Figure 2 plots both the empirical relation
between the average level of liquid assets ratio in the sample and the number of trades and
its theoretical counterpart as predicted by the model in Section 2. Panel A shows it using
the SHIW data and Panel B using the UCS data. Contrary to the model prediction we ﬁnd a
very weak correlation between liquid assets holdings and number of trades. In both surveys
the unconditional correlation is, if anything, slightly positive. This ﬁnding is quite robust as
12we discuss next.
Table 3 shows that the lack of correlation also emerges from multivariate regressions that
condition on the cross-sectional variation in income, household size, age and the importance
of labor income over total income. The reason for adding the latter variable is that one
might be concerned that the match with the model is far from perfect, and that modeling
labor income would change the results on the relation between the level of liquid asset and
the frequency of transactions. As a preliminary control for this, we include the ratio of
labor income to non-durable consumption in the regressions, and notice that the household
liquidity remains uncorrelated, if anything slightly positively correlated, with the frequency
of trades in assets (see footnote 11 for more details). Finally, similar results are obtained if
wee use a broad measure of liquid assets instead of a narrow one, if we look at median liquid
assets rather than means, if we scale liquid assets with total ﬁnancial assets (in this case the
simple correlation is somewhat negative both in the UCS sample and in the SHIW but the
elasticity is far from the predicted unit value).9
Summing up, two predictions of the model in Section 2 - a one to one relation between the
frequency of observing and that of trading ﬁnancial assets and a one to one relation between
(log) liquid assets and (log) number of trades - are poorly supported by the data. What makes
this model inadequate? Not the information or transaction frictions, that are consistent with
important features of the data such as the infrequent nature of observations and ﬁnancial
trades. Rather, we think that an important shortcoming of the model lies in its reliance on
trades between ﬁnancial assets and transaction accounts to derive a theory of liquid assets
holdings to ﬁnance non-durable consumption. To further this view we contrast the prediction
between the transactions frequency and demand for liquidity with the one, of identical nature,
that emerges in the realm of currency demand models. We use information on average
currency holdings and average number of cash withdrawals by Italian households taken from
the SHIW survey.10 Table 4 reports the (log) correlation between the average currency
balance and the frequency of transactions, measured by the number of cash withdrawals.
The correlation is always negative and statistically diﬀerent from zero (between −0.2 and
−0.5). Despite the presence of large measurement error, as documented by Alvarez and Lippi
(2009), the inventory theory of cash management ﬁnds strong support in the data, while the
9To further check whether the lack of correlation is due to the number of trades capturing some unob-
servable determinant of liquid assets holdings we regressed (unreported) the (log) liquid assets scaled by
consumption (or total assets) on the (log) number of trades adding demographic controls, as well as controls
for (log) consumption and assets. We have estimated this regression on several sub samples of investors:
all investors, all stockholders, direct stockholders. In all cases we found a small elasticity of liquid asset to
the number of ﬁnancial trades, often positive (estimates in the UCS sample range between 0.02 and 0.10
depending on sample and speciﬁcation) and always quite far from the negative one-to-one correspondence
predicted by the model.
10See Attanasio, Guiso, and Jappelli (2002) and Alvarez and Lippi (2009) for a detailed analysis.
13Table 3: Liquidity (M2) vs. trade frequency (asset transactions)
Dependent variable: (log) M/c ; Regressor: (log) asset trade frequency
Shiw data Unicredit data
bivariatea Multivariateb bivariatea Multivariateb
All investors (2,808 obs.) (1,365 obs.)
Trade freq. (log) 0.005 0.03 0.10 0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Equity investors (1,535 obs.) (875 obs.)
Trade freq. (log) 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Note: Based on the 2004 SHIW and 2003 Unicredit surveys. All regressions include a constant;
standard errors in parenthesis. M/c is the liquid asset to consumption ratio; M is M2 (similar
results obtained for M1); c is non-durable consumption (same results if total consumption is used);
for the Unicredit survey consumption is imputed from a regression in the SHIW data using income
and other demographics. −aRegression coeﬃcient of bivariate OLS. −bThis regression includes the
following controls (all in logs): household income, % of labor income over non-durable consumption,
age of household head, number of adults.
inventory theory for liquid assets management implicit in the model of Section 2 does not. In
a nutshell: the data oﬀer no evidence that asset transactions are used to ﬁnance non-durable
consumption.11 In the next section we show how keeping the frictions but abandoning non
durable consumption can reconcile theory and data.
4 Inattention and Durable Goods
This section presents a model to overcome the two empirical shortcomings discussed above,
while preserving a central role for the cost of information acquisition. One novel element
compared to the previous literature with costly observations is that the model focuses on
durable, as opposed to non-durable, consumption. Additional empirical patterns consistent
with our model are discussed in Section 6.
We consider the problem of a household who consumes only durable goods. She derives
11One may think that the omission of labor income that is credited directly into their liquid account, may
be responsible for this empirical shortcoming of the model (just like direct cash transfers, e.g. wages paid
in cash, might impinge on the Baumol-Tobin theory of the demand for currency). If this was the case, then
controlling for the labor income should reveal a negative relation between average liquidity and the frequency
of assets transactions. Instead, the lack of correlation between average liquidity and trades’ frequency persists
even in the multivariate regressions where the share of labor income over total non-durable consumption is
controlled for (see Table 3).
14Table 4: Liquidity (Currency) vs. trade frequency (# withdrawals)
Dependent Variable log(M/c); Regressor: (log) withdrawal frequency (n)
without ATM card with ATM card
bivariate multivariate bivariate multivariate
logn -0.24∗∗∗ - -0.25∗∗∗ -
logn - -0.22∗∗∗ - -0.24∗∗∗
(900 obs.) (900 obs.) ( 2,326 obs.) ( 2,325 obs.)
Dependent Variable log(W/c)
without ATM card with ATM card
bivariate multivariate bivariate multivariate
logn -0.39∗∗∗ - -0.52∗∗∗ -
logn - -0.40∗∗∗ - -0.52∗∗∗
(2,250 obs.) (2,249 obs.) ( 1,256 obs.) ( 1,255 obs.)
The asterisks denote that the null hypothesis of a zero coeﬃcient is rejected by a t-test with a 1 per
cent conﬁdence level. M = average currency holdings (coins and bills), c = average consumption
paid in cash during the year, n = average number of cash withdrawals per year from ATM and
bank-branches, W = averagesize of withdrawal from ATM and bank branches. For the multivariate
we include a dummy for self-employed, and the percentage of income paid in cash. Source: SHIW
2004.
utility proportional to the stock d of durables, which depreciates at rate δ. Her preferences
are given by discounted expected utility, and a CRRA period utility U(d) = d1−γ/(1 − γ).
The agent’s source of funds to buy/sell durables is her ﬁnancial wealth a, a fraction α of which
can be invested in risky securities and the remaining in risk-less bonds as in the previous
section. As in Grossman and Laroque (1990), there is a ﬁxed cost parameter φT of trading the
durable goods. So, if there is an adjustment in the stock of durables, say from d to d′, and the
concurrent ﬁnancial trade, the agent looses φT d. In addition, as in the rational inattention
models of the previous section, there is also a ﬁxed cost parameter φo of observing the value
of the agent’s ﬁnancial wealth. For the same reasons as in the model with non-durable goods,
i.e. to preserve homogeneity and conserve on the state space, the observation cost is assumed
to be proportional to the asset value: φo a.
Notice that we do not impose a cash in advance constraint for the durable expenditures
(in terms of liquid assets). This is because, even if we imposed it, the lumpy nature of durable
purchases would not contribute to the average holdings of liquid assets. In particular, the
ﬁxed cost gives rise to discrete adjustments, so that even when liquid assets are required
to pay for the goods they will be withdrawn and spent immediately. In other words, the
liquid asset used to pay for expenditures have an inﬁnite velocity, hence they aﬀect the
15average withdrawal size but have no eﬀect on the average holdings of liquid assets.12 Hence
in the durable goods model the frequency of ﬁnancial trades and of durable purchases do not
contribute to the average holdings of the household liquid assets. This is a desirable property
of the model given the evidence of Section 3 of the lack of correlation between the household
liquidity and the frequency of portfolio adjustment.
We let V (a,d,α) denote the value function for an agent who, after paying the observation
cost, has a durable stock d, ﬁnancial wealth a with a fraction α invested in risky assets. She
decides τ, the length of time until the next observation date and whether to pay the cost φT,
transfer resources and adjust both the portfolio share α and her durables stock to d′. These
decisions are subject to the budget constraint:
a
′ + d
′ + d φT I(d′,α′) =(d,α) = d + a (5)
where I{ } is an indicator of adjustment (of the durable stock and portfolio share). The
Bellman equation is then:




















subject to the budget constraint (5), where N(·) is the CDF of a standard normal distribution,
and R(s,τ,α) is the gross return during a period of length τ of the portfolio with share α as
deﬁned in (2).
Since the portfolio and durable adjustment is subject to a ﬁxed cost φT, it is convenient
to write the value function in (6) as:
V (a,d,α) = max{¯ V (a,d,α) , ˆ V (a,d)} . (7)
The value function V (a,d,α) compares the value of two policies: ¯ V (a,d,α), the value of
observing wealth but not adjusting durable stocks, and ˆ V (a,d), the value of observing a and
adjusting durables as well as the portfolio share. Thus, ¯ V (a,d,α) has the continuation value
if the agent, upon observing her wealth, decides an observation date τ periods from now,
12To be concrete, think about the way the transaction for the purchase of a house is typically done in the
US. On the day of the closing the buyer typically uses a certiﬁed check -a liquid asset in our parlance. The
funds of this liquid asset are typically transferred from a higher yield account one or two days before.
16leaving a,d,α unchanged:

















The value ˆ V (a,d) has the continuation value for the policy where the agent, upon observing
her wealth, decides to adjust her durable stock, so that by (5) the post-adjustment initial
stock of durables is d′ = a + d(1 − φT) − a′. She also decides a new observation date τ and
the share of risky assets α′:





















Before studying the solution of the problem with information and trading cost we analyze
three special cases. First, we discuss the frictionless problem: φo = φT = 0. This case
highlights what patterns of savings, consumption and risk exposure are preferred by the agent.
Once we reintroduce the costs, the agent will trade-oﬀ paying these costs with achieving a
proﬁle of consumption and risk exposure as close as possible to the frictionless one. Second,
we discuss the durable goods model in the presence of observation cost only (without trading
cost). This model, which is novel in the literature, is useful to understand the degree of
inaction that comes exclusively from the observation cost in the context of the durable good
model. Third, we present the model with trading cost only. These analysis provide simple
benchmarks for the more general model with both information and transactions cost.
4.1 The frictionless problem (φT = φo = 0)
In the frictionless model we deﬁne total wealth as w = a + d and consider the problem in
continuous time (i.e. time between observations τ ↓ 0). The law of motion for wealth is
dw = [−θδ + (1 − θ)(αµ + (1 − α)r)] w dt + (1 − θ)ασw dZ (10)
where θ denotes the fraction of wealth invested in durables, so that d = θw, and (1 − θ)w is
the amount invested in a portfolio with continuously compounded return R given by (2).13
This portfolio is continuously rebalanced to have a fraction of risky assets α, which is a choice
13This speciﬁcation assumes that durable goods must be purchased (i.e. cannot be rented).
17variable for the agent. We use Z for a standard Brownian motion. The Bellman equation is:
ρv(w) = max
θ,α
{ U(θw) + v


























α(1 − θ) = (µ − r)/(σ
2γ) . (12)
Few comments are in order. This version of the durable consumption model with no
transaction/observation cost maps directly into the standard Merton’s portfolio choice and
savings model with non-durable consumption. In Merton’s model the optimal policy is to
keep the ratio of consumption to wealth constant (say in the log case equal to ρ), and to
rebalance the portfolio to keep a constant fraction of wealth, equal to (µ−r)/(σ2γ), invested
in the risky asset. In the problem with durable goods and no trading/observation costs the
agent continuously observes her wealth, adjusts her stock of durable goods, and the size and
composition of her ﬁnancial assets. The mapping with Merton’s model is straightforward:
the per-period user cost of the durable good, (r + δ)d, corresponds to the consumption ﬂow
per period in Merton’s model. Equation (11) shows that in this case the agent keeps the ratio
of durable to total wealth constant. For instance, in the ’log’ case (γ = 1), the expression
gives θ = ρ/(δ + r), exactly as in Merton’s model. Equation (12) shows that the fraction
invested in the risky asset is the same as in Merton’s model, once we take into account that
the durable good behaves as a risk-less asset. Also, notice that as δ → ∞, then θ → 0. Hence
the quantity of durables that is consumed at each point is increasing in the time discount
and decreasing in the user cost of the durables that appears in the denominator.
4.2 The problem with observation cost only (φo > 0, φT = 0)
This section studies the problem assuming an observation cost φo > 0 but no cost of trading
in durables φT = 0. In this case we have that ˆ V (a,d) ≥ ¯ V (a,d,α) for all (a,d,α), because
the option to set a′ = a, α′ = α and d′ = d in problem (9) gives ¯ V (a,d,α). Hence the
agent will trade and adjust her durables every time she chooses to observe her wealth, i.e.
the agent will synchronize observing and trading. This result is the same as in the rational
inattention model of non-durable goods by Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2009), although for
diﬀerent reasons. The diﬀerence is that in the models with non-durable consumption the
18agent holds resources in a low yield transaction account, and as a consequence she chooses
to optimally synchronize the time of observation and trade, even in the presence of strictly
positive separate trade and observation costs.14
For φT = 0 the budget constraint after paying the observation cost (φo) is: a′+d′ = a+d,
and the Bellman equation can be written as a function of only one state, w ≡ a + d, and





















It is easy to see that if U is homogeneous of degree 1 − γ, so is v, and hence the optimal














(1 − θ)(1 − φo) R(s,τ,α) + θe
−δτ 1−γ
dN(s) (13)
This equation shows that in this case α is not equal to the one in Merton’s model. The reason
is that total wealth at the end of the observation period of length τ is the sum of a constant
(i.e. the deterministic value for the depreciated stock of durables) and a log normal random
variable. Since this sum is not log-normal Merton’s formula does not hold. Nevertheless, for
the numerical examples considered below, the formula provides an accurate approximation.
Solving this problem reduces to solving 4 equations in 4 unknowns, namely v(1), α, τ,
θ. These equations, whose analytics appear in Online Appendix AA - 2.2, are the three ﬁrst
order conditions for α, τ and θ, and equation (13) evaluated at the optimal choices: α∗, τ∗
and θ∗. Equation (13) shows that, as in Duﬃe and Sun (1990), optimal policy prescribes that
the agent observes the value of the portfolio at equally spaced time intervals: τ∗. Naturally,
every observation generates an adjustment of the durable stock since φT = 0 in this setup.15
Equation (13) also shows that, as in Grossman and Laroque (1990), the policy dictates an
optimal return point that is constant, i.e. after every adjustment the agent returns to the
14As shown in Table 1 and 2 this is inconsistent with the data for the Italian investors, who observe the
value of their investment about three times more often than trade. Motivated by this, we will return to the
general case with strictly positive cost of transferring-adjusting durable goods.
15Notice that our formulation of the agent problem subject to observation costs (φo > 0) but without
trading costs (φT = 0) restricts the agent choices so that she takes no action in the interval of length τ
between observation dates. But between observation dates the agent could have chosen to trade and adjust
the durable goods. In Online Appendix AA - 3 we discuss the conditions under which eliminating this
restriction does not change the optimal policy.
19Figure 3: Inaction spells τ as φo varies


































































low µ = 0.04
high δ = 0.2
Note: The model parameters are (all annualized) γ = 4, ρ = 0.02, µ = 0.06, σ = 0.16, r =
0.03, δ = 0.10 and φT = 0.00 basis points.
same value of a/d = (1−θ∗)/θ∗. Interestingly, the optimal return point for this model is quite
similar to the one from the frictionless model for small values of the observation cost; for the
parameter values in the ranges used in Figure 3 we have that θ = 0.236 and α = 0.383 in the
frictionless benchmark, while θ = 0.238 and α = 0.382 in the model with costly observations.
Overall, the frictionless model provides a good approximation to the optimal α and θ when
the frictions are small, in the order of those considered in the calibrations of Section 5.16
The optimal choice of τ trades oﬀ costs and beneﬁts: the cost is that a higher frequency
of observation implies greater attention costs for the agent. The beneﬁt is that by retrieving
information more frequently (smaller τ) the agent can do a better job at smoothing con-
sumption across states (high and low asset returns) and across periods. Because of this, the
optimal inaction interval τ∗ depends on the beneﬁt from investing in the risky assets (mea-
sured by µ,r and σ), on the depreciation rate of the durable good (δ), on the observation
cost φo and on the agent degree of risk aversion (γ). Figure 3 plots the optimal value of τ
as a function of the cost φo for three diﬀerent sets of parameter values. As expected, τ∗ is
increasing in the cost φo. When the observation cost is small the optimal inaction interval
τ has an elasticity of about 1/2 with respect to the observation cost. This elasticity reﬂects
16More evidence on the optimal values of θ in the diﬀerent models appears in Table 6 below. The gap with
the optimal return of the frictionless model increases if a large cost φo is used, or if the excess return of the
risky asset and the depreciation rate of the durable are large.
20the fact that the ﬁrst order condition of the value of the problem with respect to τ is ﬂat
around the optimum. In other words, the beneﬁts of a better consumption smoothing are
“second order”.17 Note that for a given φo, a reduction in the return of the risky asset from
6 to 4 percent reduces the expected change in wealth invested in the ﬁnancial asset, hence
the agent observes less often. Furthermore, if we increase the depreciation rate from 10 to
20 percent, the ﬂow of durable consumption decreases faster, hence the agent observes and
trades more often. To quantify the inertia implied by this model note that an observation
cost in the order of 25 basis points of wealth produces one transaction (i.e. observation and
trade) every 2.5 years, a magnitude that is comparable to what is seen in the data for the
Italian investors from the SHIW sample (see Table 2) . For a stock of assets of 50,000 euros,
in the ballpark of the observations for the investors of the SHIW sample, our durable goods
model implies that cost of one observation is about 125 euros. A more thorough comparison
between the model predictions and the Italian data appears in Section 5.2, where we will
show that when transactions costs are also present the observation costs that are needed to
match the data become small.
4.3 The problem with adjustment costs only (φo = 0,φT > 0)
In order to compare the eﬀects and magnitudes of trade cost with observation costs, in this
section we consider the case where there are only transaction cost. The set up is closely
related, but as discussed later not identical, to the one in Grossman and Laroque (1990).
Since φo = 0 agents observe their wealth continuously, and trade only when the ratio of
durables goods to ﬁnancial wealth is either too high or too low, at which time they pay the
ﬁxed cost, rearrange the portfolio, trade and adjust their durable stock. In particular, we can
describe the optimal decision rule by three numbers: a, ˆ a, and ¯ a. Denoting a(t) = a(t)/d(t),
the agent remains inactive as long as a(t) is between a and ¯ a, and as soon as it hits either
barrier she pays the transaction cost, rearrange the portfolio weight α if appropriate, and
adjust the durable stock so as to have a post-adjustment ratio of ˆ a. Denoting the value
function of the agent by V (a,d;α), we have that for a/d / ∈ [a,¯ a]






′ = a + d(1 − φT)} , (14)
17See Alvarez, Lippi, and Paciello (2009) and Reis (2006b) for an analytical characterization of the 1/2
elasticity with respect to the observation cost in a stylized version of a similar problem, and Reis (2006a)
and Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2007) for a similar result for two related models with non-durable goods.
21where we denote the value of the optimal weight as ˆ α. In the range of inaction a/d ∈ [a,¯ a]
we have the familiar continuous time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
ρV (a,d, ˆ α) =
d1−γ
1 − γ







Figure 4: Expected time between adjustments w.r.t. φT


































































low µ = 0.04
high δ = 0.2
Note: The model parameters are (all annualized) γ = 4, ρ = 0.02, µ = 0.06, σ = 0.16, r =
0.03, δ = 0.10 and φo = 0.00 basis points.
The main diﬀerence with the model in Grossman and Laroque (1990) is that we allow
the agent to rearrange the portfolio weight α only at the time of a trade and adjustment of
durables while they, as well as Stokey (2009), allow continuous adjustment on that margin.
Our model can thus be interpreted as one where the adjustment cost applies to the manage-
ment of assets. In the Online Appendix AA - 2.3 we ﬁll in the details of the characterization
of the optimal decision rule and describe the characterization of the expected time between
successive adjustments. Figure 4 shows the behavior predicted by this model for a range
of values of the transaction cost φT. The expected time between adjustments is increasing
in the level of the transaction cost. The ﬁgure also shows that the expected time between
adjustment is decreasing in the depreciation rate δ and increasing in the expected return µ.
The logic behind these eﬀects is analogous to the one discussed in Section 4.2 for the model
with the observation cost. To compare the outcomes of the two models the value of one cost
must be normalized, so that the dollar cost φT d equals the dollar cost φo a (this because the
transaction and observation cost apply to diﬀerent stocks). In the benchmark the value of
22a/d ∼ = 3, so that a given value of φo is comparable to a value of φT that is approximately three
times smaller. Once this adjustment is done a comparison of the outcomes in Figure 3 and
Figure 4 shows that observation and transaction cost give rise to similar levels of inaction in
the diﬀerent models. For example for φT = 30 the model predicts one trade every 1.8 years,
the same number that is obtained in the model with observation costs when φo = 10.
Finally, the numerical solution of the model reveals that the expected time between
adjustments has an elasticity with respect to the transaction cost φT close to 1/3. This
diﬀers from the model with observation costs where the elasticity (w.r.t. φo) is close to 1/2.18
We note that the workings of this model are quantitatively consistent with the ﬁndings of
Stokey (2009). She builds a model with both durable and nondurable goods calibrated to
interpret the durables as housing stock. She ﬁnds that with a transactions cost of about
10 percent agents adjust their durable goods every 24.7 years. Considering a transaction
cost that is 1,000 times smaller (i.e. 10 basis points) our model predicts 0.8 adjustments
per year, that is about 30 times smaller than the adjustment frequency in Stokey. These
ratios are roughly in line with an elasticity of the frequency of adjustment with respect to
the transaction cost close to 1/2.
4.4 The problem with observation and adjustment costs (φo >
0,φT > 0)
This section outlines the nature of the optimal policy for the problem in the presence of both
transaction and observation costs. We show that in this case there is no perfect synchroniza-
tion between portfolio observations and portfolio adjustments. A numerical illustration of
the workings of the model is given in the next section.
The optimal decision rule for trading-transferring resources and adjusting the durable
goods is of the sS type. This is due to the homogeneity of the value function and to the fact
that α is not a state in problem (9). Notice that for any ﬁxed value of α the value function
V (a,d,α) and the associated functions ˆ V (a,d) and ¯ V (a,d,α) are all homogenous of degree
1−γ on (a,d). The homogeneity follows from the assumptions of homogeneity of U(·), from
the speciﬁcation of the ﬁxed cost of adjustment as proportional to the value of the current
state (φoa and φTd), and from the linearity of the budget constraint.
Let ˆ H(a+d(1−φT),a′,α,τ) denote the objective function to be maximized on the right
hand side of the Bellman equation for ˆ V in (9), given the wealth a + d(1 − φT) after paying
the trade cost. Notice that for ﬁxed values of α and τ the function ˆ H(·,·,α,τ) is homogenous
18As the depreciation rate gets close to zero the elasticity converges to 1/2 also in the transaction cost
model. See Section 5.2 for more discussion of the eﬀect of the drift/volatility of the state on these elasticities.
23of degree 1 − γ. Then we can consider the maximization:
{1 − ˆ θ, ˆ α, ˆ τ} = argmax
θ,α,τ
ˆ H (1,1 − θ,α,τ) subject to 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, α,τ ≥ 0 . (16)
The homogeneity implies that the optimal decision rules for a generic state (a,d) if the agent
trades and adjusts the durable stock are given by:
a
′ = (1 − ˆ θ)(a + d(1 − φT)) , d
′ = ˆ θ (a + d(1 − φT)),
and that the optimal choices of τ and α are independent of (a,d). For notation convenience
we use a ≡ a/d = (1 − θ)/θ to denote the normalized ratio of assets to durables. Let
¯ H(a,d,α,τ) be the objective function to be maximized on the right hand side of the Bellman
equation for ¯ V in equation (8) given the state (a,d,α). Notice that for ﬁxed (α,τ) the
function ¯ H(·,·,α,τ) is homogenous of degree 1 − γ. Consider the problem:
¯ τ (a,α) = argmax
τ≥0
¯ H (a,1,α,τ) .
where ¯ τ is a function of a/d because of the homogeneity of ¯ H. Now consider an agent with
α = ˆ α and durable stock d, who pays the observation cost and discovers her ﬁnancial wealth
(net of the observation cost) to be a. In this case, using a ≡ a/d, the agent will trade and
adjust if
¯ V (a,1, ˆ α) < ˆ V (a,1),
where we have used the homogeneity of ˆ V (·) and ¯ V (·, ˆ α). Let
¯ I ⊂ R+ ≡
 
a : ¯ V (a,1, ˆ α) > ˆ V (a,1)
 
,
then the optimal policy is of the form:
a ∈ ¯ I =⇒ a
′ = a , τ = ¯ τ(a, ˆ α),
a / ∈ ¯ I =⇒ a
′ = ˆ a =
1 − ˆ θ
ˆ θ
, τ = ˆ τ .
The optimal policy is as follows. The set ¯ I deﬁnes an interval [a,¯ a] for values of the normalized
state variable a where it is optimal for the agent not to trade and not to adjust the stock
of durables. This happens because in the interior of the interval ¯ V (a,1, ˆ α) > ˆ V (a,1, ˆ α), see
Online Appendix AA - 2.4.
It is immediate that ˆ a ∈ ¯ I, i.e. that the optimal return point ˆ a is in the range of inaction.
24The size of the inaction interval depends on the ﬁxed cost φT, among other determinants.
Thus if at the time of observing the state a falls in the interval [a,¯ a] the agent will ﬁnd it
optimal not to pay the ﬁxed cost, to leave d unaltered, and to set a new observation date
τ(a) periods from now. Otherwise, if at the time of observing the state a falls outside the
interval [a,¯ a], then the agent will pay the cost φT d, adjust the stock of durables, and set
the new ratio of ﬁnancial assets to durables to ˆ a. She will also set a new observation date
ˆ τ periods from now. The analysis shows that along an optimal path there will be instances
where the agent will pay the observation cost but will not trade, as in the data for Italian
investors displayed in Table 1 and Table 2.
5 A Quantitative Exploration
In this section we analyze some quantitative implications of the model by means of numerical
solutions. First, we describe the decision rule, then we solve the model for diﬀerent parameters
values and develop some comparative statics to illustrate its workings. Finally, we use the
numerical solution to relate the model to moments taken from the Italian investors’ data.
5.1 Decision rules
The horizontal axis of Figure 5 displays the values of the ratio of the ﬁnancial assets to
durable goods a ≡ a/d, right after the agent has observed the value of ﬁnancial assets, and
before deciding whether to trade and to adjust the durable stock. As discussed above, the
optimal decision rule about adjusting the durables is of the sS type. The two vertical bars
at a and ¯ a denote the threshold values that delimit the inaction region. The vertical bar at
ˆ a, inside the inaction region, denotes the optimal return point after an adjustment. As was
the case in Section 4.2 for small frictions the value of the optimal return point is very close
to the one from the frictionless model.19
The optimal decision after an observation is made of two rules: the ﬁrst rule is whether
(and by how much) to adjust the durable stock, the second rule gives a date for the next
observation. The adjustment decision, after observing the value of the assets, depends on
the location of the state a. The middle panel contains the range of inaction, where the agent
chooses not to adjust her ﬁnancial asset and durable stock. Outside of this region, the agent
will pay the adjustment cost φT d, trade and adjust her ﬁnancial asset and stock of durables
to the values (a′,d′) that satisfy a′/d′ = ˆ a. The adjustments that occur to the left of a involve
19For the values used in Figure 5, comparing the ratio of durables to total wealth ˆ θ ≡ d′/(a′ + d′) deﬁned
in equation (16), with the corresponding ratio in the frictionless model where φo = φT = 0, denoted by θ,
shows that ˆ θ = 0.238, while θ = 0.237.
25Figure 5: Optimal Decision rule (normalizing d = 1)
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Note: Benchmark parameter values are γ = 4, annualized: ρ = 0.02, µ = 0.06, σ = 0.16, r =
0.03, δ = 0.10, and φo = 0.01 basis points , φT = 0.5 basis points.
a sale of part of the durable stock d, while the ones to the right of ¯ a involve purchases that
add to the durable stock d. The discontinuous solid line in Figure 5 displays the optimal
time until the next observation. This rule is made of two functions. One is the optimal
time until the next observation contingent on trading, which is given by the constant value
ˆ τ. This is analogous to the optimal rule in Duﬃe and Sun (1990) and in Section 4.2, where
each observation is also a trade. The other function gives the optimal time until the next
observation contingent on not trading. This function depends on the state a, and is denoted
by ¯ τ(a/d) in the ﬁgure. Thus, the optimal decision rule (solid line) is given by ¯ τ(·) in the
inaction region, and by ˆ τ in the adjustment regions.
We notice several properties of the optimal time until the next observation:
1. the function ¯ τ(·) is hump shaped,
2. the value of ¯ τ(ˆ a) = ˆ τ,
3. the values of ¯ τ(a) and ¯ τ(¯ a) are strictly positive
4. the function ¯ τ(·) reaches zero for values of a/d strictly inside the adjustment regions.
5. the maximum of ¯ τ(·) lies to the left of ˆ a,
26The reason why point 1 holds, is that when the agent is inside the inaction region but
close to the borders, she realizes that the state (a) is likely to reach the adjustment region
shortly, and hence it is optimal to revise the information soon. In the middle of the inaction
region, instead, the expected time before reaching the adjustment region is greater, and thus
the optimal time to the next revision is longer. The reason why point 2 holds is that if, upon
observing, the value of a/d happens to coincide with the optimal return point ˆ a, then the
objective function w.r.t. τ is the same as the one when adjustment is considered (i.e. ˆ V ),
and thus so is the value for the optimal inaction interval. Point 3 holds because if τ was zero
on the boundary, the agent would be paying the observation cost an arbitrarily large number
of times in a short period of time. Point 4 holds because if a/d is large, and the agent is
forced not to trade (that is the assumption underlying the deﬁnition of the function ¯ τ), she
will choose to review immediately and trade. Finally, the reason why point 5 holds is that in
our parametrization the ratio a(t)/d(t) has a drift to the right (when it is not controlled by
adjustments), approximately equal to the sum of the expected return on the ﬁnancial asset
plus the depreciation rate. Thus when a/d is close to ˆ a, but to its left, the agent forecasts to
be in the inaction for a time longer than ˆ τ.20
Table 5: Observation and trade frequency (per year) as
φT
φo varies









0.01 0.1 7.7 3.6 0.47 10 3.18 3
0.01 0.5 7.1 2.1 0.29 50 3.16 16
0.01 2.5 5.2 1.3 0.25 250 3.10 81
0.01 10.0 4.9 0.8 0.16 1,000 3.02 331
0.05 0.5 4.0 2.0 0.50 10 3.15 3
0.05 2.5 3.3 1.2 0.37 50 3.10 16
0.05 12.5 3.0 0.7 0.24 250 3.00 83
0.05 50.0 2.6 0.5 0.18 1,000 2.88 347
0.01/3 0.1 12.8 3.8 0.29 30 3.19 9
0.02 100.0 3.3 0.4 0.11 5,000 2.81 1,779
Notes: The variables φo and φT are measured in basis points (bp). The other parameters
are γ = 4,δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.02, r = 0.03, µ = 0.06, σ = 0.16 per year. The variable ˆ a ≡ 1−θ
θ is
the optimal return point, given by the ratio of the value of assets (net of observation cost)
and that of durables (net of transaction cost).
20In Alvarez, Lippi, and Paciello (2009) we study a stylized version of this problem, for which we derive
analytically the properties of the decision rules discussed here. In particular, the shape displayed in Figure 5
follows from the combination of two limit cases studied in that paper: the case with uncertainty and no-drift
on the state, and the case of no-uncertainty and drift on the state.
275.2 Some calibration exercises
Given the nature of the decision rule it is immediate to see that a(t)/d(t) follows a stationary
Markov process with a unique invariant measure. Table 5 shows how the number of obser-
vations and trades varies for diﬀerent combination of the observation and transaction costs
φo and φT. In this exercise the parameters γ,r,µ,σ,ρ are set to values that are common in
the literature, see e.g. Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2009), to facilitate comparison of results.
The depreciation parameter is set to ten percent annual (δ = 0.10), so that the half life of the
durable good is between 6 and 7 years, which seems a reasonable value for the kind of durable
goods that we observe (see Table 10). The comparative statics for some of these parameters
is discussed below. The ﬁrst two columns in the table report the values of φo and φT used
in the computation of each row. The columns # observ. and # trades report, respectively,
the expected number of observations and the expected number of trades per year, under the
invariant measure. The ﬁfth column reports the ratio between these frequencies and the sixth
column gives the ratio between the transaction over the observation cost. Since these costs
apply to diﬀerent aggregates (a and d, respectively), the next to column reports the optimal
return point a = a/d which is used, in the last column, to compute the ratio between the
transaction and observation costs properly scaled.
We use the numerical results of Table 5 to illustrate three main quantitative properties of
the model with respect to the costs φo and φT. First, the model generates substantial inaction
with relatively small observation and transactions cost. For instance in the parameterization
used in the second row of Table 5 (also used in Figure 5 ) the observation cost is φo =
0.01/10,000 of the post-observation ﬁnancial wealth (i.e. 1/100 of one basis point), and the
trade cost is φT = 0.5/10,000 of the pre-adjustment stock of durable. Yet, in spite of these
small costs, the expected number of observations per year is 7.1 and the average number of
trades is 2.1.
Second, we notice that keeping all the other parameters ﬁxed the ratio between the
frequency of trades and the frequency of observations is a monotone decreasing function of
the ratio of the two costs: φT/φo. This can be seen by comparing the four rows in the upper
part of the table, where φo = 0.01, with the four rows in the next panel, where φo = 0.05.
The ratio φT/φo is 10, 50, 250, and 1,000 across the lines of each panel. Notice that as this
ratio increases the ratio between the frequency of trades to the frequency of observations
decreases. Moreover, notice that despite a 5-fold increase in the level of both costs (φT,φo)
between the upper and the middle panel, a comparison across these panels shows that in
the lines that share a common value of φT/φo the ratio of trades to observation is essentially
constant. For instance for φT/φo = 10 the ratio between trades and observation is around
0.5, irrespective of the level of the cost. This shows that the ratio between the frequency of
28observation and trade depends, approximately, on the ratio of the two costs.21
Third, the elasticity of the average number of observations per year with respect to the
cost φo is a bit smaller than 0.4. Theoretically we expect the elasticity to be between 1/3
and 1/2, based on the results in Alvarez, Lippi, and Paciello (2009). In that paper we show
that the number of adjustments per unit of time has an elasticity of 1/2 for three stylized
versions of the model: the one with observation cost only, the one with adjustment cost
only, and the one with both costs provided that the costs are small and that the drift of the
state is small relative to its volatility. If, instead, the drift/volatility of the state is large, the
elasticity is 1/3 for small cost. In the model of this paper the relevant state is the (log) of
a(t)/d(t), which has a non negligible drift due mostly to the depreciation rate of durables, so
the elasticity is between 1/3 and 1/2.
Table 6: Observations, trades and welfare loss in diﬀerent models (per year)
φo (bp) φT(bp) # observ. # trades ˆ a Consumption loss
w.r.t. frictionlessa
Model: No frictions
0.00 0.00 ∞ ∞ 3.22 0
Model: Observation cost only
0.01/3 0.00 17.1 17.1 3.20 0.03 (%)
0.02 0.00 7.3 7.3 3.19 0.07 (%)
Model: Transaction cost only
0.00 0.10 ∞ 4.1 3.19 0.05 (%)
0.00 100.00 ∞ 0.4 2.81 3.50 (%)
Model: Observation & transaction cost
0.01/3 0.10 12.8 3.8 3.19 0.07 (%)
0.02 100.00 3.3 0.4 2.81 3.52 (%)
Notes: The variables φo and φT are measured in basis points (bp). The other parameters
are γ = 4,δ = 0.10, ρ = 0.02, r = 0.03, µ = 0.06, σ = 0.16 per year. The variable ˆ a ≡ 1−θ
θ is
the optimal return point, given by the ratio of the value of assets (net of observation cost)
and that of durables (net of transaction cost). −aThis loss gives the compensating variation
in the annual ﬂow of durable consumption (in %) that is needed to equate the welfare level
to the one obtained in the frictionless model (both value functions are evaluated at the ˆ a of
the model with frictions).
Next, we calibrate the model to assess the importance of observation and transaction
costs using the data for the Italian investors. As a reference we take two set of numbers from
Table 2 corresponding to direct stock-holders from the UCS and another from all investors
21See Alvarez, Lippi, and Paciello (2009) for an analytical derivation of the conditions under which the
ratio of the observation and trade frequency depends only on the ratio of the observation and trading costs,
in a simpler model with a quadratic return function.
29for SHIW. We think of the UCS stock holder as representative of a pool of more sophisticated
investors, while the data in SHIW are representative of the typical Italian investors. The
sophisticated investor trades about 4 times a year, and observes about 12 times a year, so the
ratio of trades per observation is 0.3. Instead the typical investor trades about 0.4 times a
year and observes about 3.6 times a year, so that the ratio of trades per observation is about
0.1.22 The third panel of Table 5 presents two calibrations chosen to match the behavior of
these two investors. For an observation cost of φo = 0.01/3 basis point and a transaction
cost of φT = 0.1 basis point the model predicts 12.8 observations and 3.8 trades per year,
i.e. a ratio of 0.29 trades per observation. This parametrization gets close to the behavior
of the sophisticated investor, matching the levels and the ratio of the observation and trade
frequency. This suggests that the ratio between transaction and observation costs, measured
in euros using the values of the stocks at the time of adjustment, is (φT/φo)×(d/a) ≈ 10 i.e.
one order of magnitude. The simulation in the last line of the table uses an observation cost
of φo = 0.02 basis point and a transaction cost of φT = 100 basis points. This produces 3.3
observations and 0.4 trades a year, with roughly 0.1 trades per observation. These ﬁgures
are close to those of the typical Italian investor. In this case the ratio of the trade to the
observation cost, measured in euros at the time of adjustment is (φT/φo) × (d/a) ≈ 1,780
or three orders of magnitude. Thus, to approximately match the behavior of the typical
Italian investor, a very large ratio of the transaction to the observation cost is required,
approximately 180 times larger than the one for the sophisticated investor.
Altogether, the calibration shows that the magnitude of the observation cost φo that
is necessary to match observed patterns of behavior is small. For instance, if we use one
percent of one basis point for a ﬁnancial wealth of a 130,000 euros (which is about the
median for the UCS sample of direct equity holder), the observation cost is about 13 euro
cents. The adjustment cost for trading durables are also small in the simulation that we
associate with the sophisticated investors, and larger (up to one percent) for the simulation
that we associate with the typical Italian investor. These transaction costs may look small
if they are interpreted as costs of trading durables, as they literally are in the model. But
if the transaction cost is interpreted as a ﬁxed costs in asset trading then these values, from
a few up to 100 basis points, are consistent with recent asset-transaction cost estimates for
the US in Bonaparte and Cooper (2009). This reinterpretation is fully consistent with our
model since the costs are ﬁxed (it is only for notation convenience that we model the two
costs as applying to diﬀerent stocks).
To quantify the relevance of these costs Table 6 compares the outcomes of this model
22 Recall that the observation data for the SHIW investors are noisy as they are imputed from a regression
on UCS data, see the note to Table 2.
30with the ones produced by the three special cases discussed in the previous section: the
frictionless benchmark, the observation-cost only and the transaction-cost only. The analysis
shows that transaction costs in the order of one percent of the durable stock are not negligible
for the investor. Notice that even though the cost is paid on average once every 2.5 years
its impact on welfare, measured by the compensating variation in the annual consumption
ﬂow, is about 3.5 percent. This is due to the fact that the good is durable, so that the ﬂow
value is approximately given by c = (r + δ)d, so that a unit change in d aﬀects the period
utility ﬂow approximately by a factor 1/(r+δ). For the median investors, to which the model
was calibrated, the welfare eﬀect of the observation cost are much smaller, as a consequence
of their smaller size. From Table 6 we conclude that, at the values of the transaction and
observation cost that we focus on, the behavior of the model with both costs is very similar
to one with the transaction cost only. We arrive to this conclusion by comparing the number
of trades per year, as well as the post-trade ratio of ﬁnancial assets to durables, for the
two benchmark cases displayed in the two panels in the bottom of Table 6. In particular, a
comparison of the “Transaction cost only” panel with the “Observation & transaction cost”
panel shows that the number of trades per year is essentially unaltered by the presence of
the small observation costs. Moreover the consumption loss w.r.t. the frictionless benchmark
is very small, in the order of 2 basis points of the annual consumption ﬂow (say 0.05% vs
0.07% or 3.50% vs 3.52%). Alternatively, these ﬁgures suggest that for the parametrizations
considered in these panels observing between 3.3 to 12.8 times per year provides almost the
same information as observing continuously.
We conclude the section with a remark on the asymmetry of the ¯ τ(a/d) function discussed
in point 5. Notice that if the process for a(t)/d(t) has a strong drift, i.e. if the return on
ﬁnancial assets plus depreciation is large, then most adjustments will happen in the right
adjustment region, and hence they will involve a liquidation of assets and a purchase of
durables. The frequency with which a(t)/d(t) hits the “sale” region relative to the “buy”
region depends on the strength of the drift, which is approximately equal to αµ+(1−α)r +
δ, relative to the variability of this ratio, which is about (1 − θ)ασ ≈ (µ − r)/(γσ) (see
equation (12)). In Table 7 we show how this frequency varies with δ and σ. As expected
from the direct eﬀect on the drift, larger values of δ lead to a larger fraction of adjustments
being purchases. For larger value of σ, the net eﬀect is to decrease the exposure to risk
(through equation (12)), so that the variability of a(t)/d(t) actually decreases. Thus, for low
σ, the variability of a(t)/d(t) is high, and hence the process reach both thresholds more often,
which explains why the fraction of sales is smaller for σ = 0.06 than for σ = 0.16. In our
benchmark numerical example 98% of adjustments are purchases of durables (see Table 7).
This comes close to the comparable ﬁgure for Italian investors that is 95% (see Table 10).
31Table 7: Durable trades in the model: Fraction of Purchases
Depreciation Rate (δ) Volatility (σ)
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.16 0.26
Fraction of Purchases 0.88 0.98 0.99 0.60 0.98 1.00
Benchmark parameters: γ = 4, µ = 0.06, ρ = 0.02, r = 0.03, φo = 0.01 (bp), φT = 0.5 (bp).
6 Some evidence on the durable goods model
This section contrasts two predictions of the durable goods model with data from the UCS
2003 and the SHIW 2004 survey. The ﬁrst prediction pertains to the relation between the
investor risk aversion and the frequency of observations. The second relates to the frequency
of durable purchases and that of assets transactions.
6.1 Observations and portfolio riskiness vs. risk aversion
An increase in the degree of relative risk aversion has two eﬀects in the model: ﬁrst, it induces
the investor to hold a safer portfolio; second, it increases the value of consumption smoothing.
The ﬁrst eﬀect, whose strength depends on the attractiveness of the risky asset, as measured
by its Sharpe ratio (µ − r)/σ, lowers the value of information and implies that a more risk-
averse investor chooses to observe her investments less frequently. This eﬀect is akin to the
one ﬁrst studied by Verrecchia (1982) (see Corollary 1) and Peress (2004) (Theorem 2) who
show that agents with a higher risk aversion have weaker incentives to obtain precise signals
(i.e. information) about the return of the risky asset.23 In our context this channel relates to
the frequency one gathers information about the value of the investments rather than to the
quality of the signal received. The second eﬀect, raises the value of information and thus,
through this channel, more risk averse investors should observe more frequently.
Which of the two eﬀects prevails in our model depends on parameters values. For large
enough, yet realistic values of the Sharpe ratio (µ−r)/σ, and small values of the cost φT,φo,
the portfolio eﬀect dominates the consumption-smoothing eﬀect over a reasonable range of
values of the degree of risk aversion. Hence, the frequency of observing ones’ investments
is lower for more risk averse investors. Table 8 shows that the share invested in the risky
asset and the frequency of portfolio observations both decrease as the degree of relative risk
aversion increases, for a parametrization of the costs that was shown to produce a reasonable
23Verrecchia assumes the utility function displays constant absolute risk aversion in wealth. Peress shows
that the same result obtains if absolute risk aversion is decreasing in wealth, so that wealthier individuals
invest more into risky assets and hence have greater incentive to acquire information.
32match of the behavior of the investor from the UCS survey (see Section 5.2).
Table 8: Eﬀect of risk aversion (γ) on trade and observation frequency
γ Risky asset share ˆ a # observ. # trades
# trades
# observ.
8 0.146 3.20 6.3 4.1 0.65
7 0.167 3.20 6.4 3.9 0.62
6 0.194 3.18 6.8 3.8 0.56
5 0.234 3.18 6.8 3.6 0.52
4 0.292 3.18 7.7 3.6 0.46
3 0.389 3.22 8.4 3.6 0.43
2 0.584 3.39 10.3 4.1 0.43
Notes: The share in risky asset is computed by Merton’s formula, i.e. α (1 − θ) = (r −
µ)/(γ σ2). The other model parameters ρ = 0.02, r = 0.03, µ = 0.06, σ = 0.16, δ = 0.10
(all per year), φo = 1/100 (bp), φT = 1/10 (bp).
We can test this prediction of the model because the UCS survey has an indicator of risk
aversion patterned after the Survey of Consumer Finance. Investors are asked: “Which of the
following statements comes closest to the amount of ﬁnancial risk that you are willing to take
when you make your ﬁnancial investment: (1) a very high return, with a very high risk of
loosing the money; (2) high return and high risk; (3) moderate return and moderate risk; (4)
low return and no risk”.24 Only 19% choose “low return and no risk”, so most are willing to
accept some risk if compensated by a higher return. A recent literature on eliciting preferences
from survey data shows that direct questions on risk aversion are informative and have
predictive power.25 Consistent with this literature, Figure 6 shows that the portfolio share
invested in risky assets (direct and indirect stocks) is monotonically decreasing with our index
of risk aversion; the correlation and its signiﬁcance are conﬁrmed in (unreported) regressions
that control also for measures of investors assets, income and demographic characteristics,
reassuring us about the reliability of our risk aversion indicator.
To analyze the model implications Table 9 shows regressions for diﬀerent groups of the
(log) number of times an investor observes his investments and the risk aversion indicator
while controlling for endowment (log consumption) and demographic characteristics. We
use three dummies for risk aversion, excluding the group with the highest risk aversion.
Irrespective of which sample we use (the whole sample or that of the stockholders, total or
direct) we ﬁnd that more risk tolerant individuals observe their investments more frequently
24The question does not distinguish between relative and absolute risk aversion. But since we can control
for wealth, we can allow the risk aversion indicator to reﬂect diﬀerences in risk preferences that do not arise
from diﬀerences in endowments.
25See, among others, Barsky et al. (1997) and Guiso and Paiella (2008).
33than less risk tolerant ones, consistent with the prediction of the model.26
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Note: The ﬁgure is based on the sample of investors (direct and in direct stockholders and holders
of other risky assets) in the UCS sample. The share in risky assets is the value of risky ﬁnancial
assets in total ﬁnancial assets. Risk aversion takes 4 values from very low (indicator equal to 1) to
very high (indicator equal to 4), see Appendix A.
We notice that the predicted negative relation between risk aversion and the frequency
of observations is a property of the model of assets trades and durable goods with attention
costs but it is not speciﬁc to it. In fact the same prediction obtains in models with non-
durable goods, assets trades and attention costs and can thus be viewed as a general test of
models of assets trades with attention costs.
6.2 The correlation between trades in assets and in durables
The second test we consider in this section is speciﬁc to our durable goods model. By
abstracting from the non-durable purchases, agents in our model trade only to adjust their
purchase of durables, hence we expect that agents who are more active in purchasing durables
are also more active in assets transactions.
We test this prediction using information in the SHIW 2004 survey on the frequency of
durable purchases and the frequency of asset transactions of Italian households. In particular,
the survey registers whether the household bought or sold durable goods in each of three
categories: housing, vehicles and jewelry in the year prior to the interview. It also records
26Guiso and Jappelli (2007) using the 2003 UCS data ﬁnd that the amount of time investors spend collecting
ﬁnancial information is negatively correlated with the risk aversion indicator which is also consistent with
the model idea that risk aversion weakens investors incentives to obtain information about their investments,
either by checking frequently their value (as in our model) or by obtaining costly signals.
34Table 9: Risk aversion and portfolio observations in the data
Dependent Variable : log of Number of Observations per year
All Investors Direct + Indirect
(1456 obs.) Stockholders (944 obs.)
Risk Aversion Dummies:
Very Low γ 1.36∗∗∗ - 1.14∗∗∗ -
Low γ 0.66∗∗∗ - 0.51∗∗∗ -
Medium γ 0.50∗∗∗ - 0.35∗ -
Share Risky assets α 1.67∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗
Three (one) asterisks denote that the null hypothesis of a zero coeﬃcient is rejected by a t-test
with a 1 (10) per cent conﬁdence level. Source: UCS 2003 survey. All regressions with controls
(demographics, consumption, etc). Risk aversion is measured as answer to a question on risk and
expected returns sought. High risk aversion is the excluded category.
Table 10: Fraction of Investors who adjusted the durables stock in 2004
Jewelry Cars Furniture All Housinga
& Antiques & other & appliances
All investors (2,808 obs.)
0.09 0.15 0.37 0.47 -
% purchasesb 97 83 100c 95
By Investor type
Portfolio adjust.
< 1 per year (824 obs.) 0.07 0.13 0.34 0.42 0.04
≥ 1 per year (1,984 obs.) 0.12 0.20 0.45 0.57 0.06
Source: SHIW - Bank of Italy. Notes: Statistics computed for 2,808 households with ﬁnancial assets other
than bank or postal account. For each category of durables, an adjustment means that the household
records at least one purchase or one sale in 2004. −aMeasures the proportion of household who bought
or sold a house over a 5-year window.
whether it has bought house appliances (furniture, electrical apparel, etc). Thus, even though
we do not have the total number of purchases or sales, we have information on whether the
household engaged in trading durables in any of these categories. The upper panel of Table 10
reports the fraction of investor/households who were active in each of these 4 categories. For
instance, the fraction of investors who bought a durable in the car & other transportation
category in 2004 is 15%. As a ﬁrst check of the plausibility of the model prediction that asset
trades and durable trades are correlated, the lower panel of the table shows that the fraction
of investors who purchased durable goods in 2004 is higher among those who traded ﬁnancial
35assets more often.27 Notice that if we condition on the sample of investors who traded more
often (i.e. at least once in a year) the proportion of those who bought a car rises from 15
to 20%. Notice that this same pattern is found in each of the various categories for which
we have information on the durable purchases. This pattern is consistent with the model
outlined in Section 4.4 if investors diﬀer in the costs φT and φo.
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Note: Portfolio trades is the number of asset transactions in 2004 (categorical); Durable trades is a proxy
for the number of durable transactions in 2004 (see the text). The line plots the mean of the durable
trades indicator corresponding to each portfolio-trade-frequency bin. The dots denote 2 standard error
bands around the mean.
Based on the survey data, we also construct a “durable trade frequency” proxy as the sum
of the 0/1 dummies for the three entries Jewelry & Antiques, Cars.., Furniture & appliances..
(we exclude housing because there are few observations available in a given year). The proxy
variable ranges from 0 (no purchases or sales across categories) to 4 (at least one purchase
and one sale in each category). Figure 7 shows that the asset trade frequency and this proxy
for durable purchase frequency are strongly correlated. Table 11 shows that the bivariate
correlation remains strong and statistically signiﬁcant in a multivariate regression analysis
that includes household income and demographics. The correlation is also visible if the sample
is restricted to the equity investors (those for whom according to the model the information
problem is likely to be more relevant).
27The same pattern is found by running logit regressions for the purchase of durables, on trade frequencies
dummies, non-durables consumption, and demographics.
36Table 11: Durable vs. portfolio trade frequency
Dependent variable: (log) durable trade freq. ; Regressor: (log) portfolio trade frequency
All investors (2,808 obs.) Equity investors (1,535 obs.)
bivariatea Multivariateb bivariatea Multivariateb
Trade freq. (log) 0.27 0.16 0.16 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Note: Based on the 2004 SHIW survey. All regressions include a constant; standard errors in parenthesis.
The durable adjustment frequency is an estimate of the average number of durable purchases per year (see
the text for a detailed deﬁnition). −aRegression coeﬃcient of bivariate OLS. −bThis regression includes
the following controls (all in logs): household income, age of household head, number of adults.
7 Conclusions
This paper provides a quantitative analysis of the rational inattention hypothesis by studying
how investors manage their ﬁnancial assets, liquidity and consumption under the assumption
that they face a cost to observe the value of their assets. First, we present direct empirical
evidence from a cross-section of individual investors that is consistent with key features of
costly observation models: investors collect information about the value of their investments
and trade in assets only infrequently. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst direct
evidence that is brought to bear on the issue of infrequent portfolio observations/trades and
costly observation of the relevant state.
The second contribution is to modify one single feature of existing rational inattention
models of asset management in a way that allows the theory to get closer to matching the
data. The modiﬁcation consists in shifting the focus from non-durable to durable consump-
tion choices. As discussed in the introduction, state-of-the art models based on non-durable
consumption yield two counterfactual predictions: an equal frequency of observing and trad-
ing, and a negative link between the frequency of trading and the investor’s liquidity. Our
model of durable goods adjustment and asset management reconciles the theory with the
data, as the model predicts that the frequency of observing must be greater than the fre-
quency of asset trading, and is consistent with the empirical absence of correlation between
liquid assets holdings and assets trading frequency.
Two predictions of the durable-goods model are supported by the data. First, a positive
correlation is detected between trades in assets and in durables. Second, the heterogeneity
in the frequency investors observe their investments can be explained by heterogeneous risk
attitudes: because more risk tolerant individuals invest more in volatile assets they value
37information more and thus gather information more frequently.
A quantitative assessment of the consequences of observation and transaction costs is
developed using numerical simulations of the model to match the number of observations
and trades of the median Italian investor (about 4 and 0.4 per year, respectively) for a ﬁ-
nancial wealth of 50,000 euros. The analysis shows that a model with durable goods and
no transaction costs implies that to reproduce the low trading frequency observed in the
data the observation costs need to be in the order of 100 euros per observation. Consid-
ering the narrow notion of information gathering used by our paper, namely observing the
value of one’s ﬁnancial wealth, these costs seem unrealistically high. The model with both
costs can reproduce the observed frequency of portfolio observations and asset trading with
small observation costs (about 10 euro cents per observation) and transaction costs of about
100 euros per trade. Even though these small observation costs help explaining infrequent
observations, the model shows they have negligible economic consequences: the patterns of
consumer choices and frequency of trades is very close to the one observed if attention costs
are absent and consumers only face trading costs. Based on this, we conclude that assets
observation costs, and the inattention they induce, have negligible economic consequences.
Trading costs of the classical nature emphasized in the literature carry instead ﬁrst order
losses to consumers.
The small value of observation costs that we end up estimating is not inherent to the model
we propose, but follows by matching the model with the investors’ data. In Alvarez, Lippi,
and Paciello (2009) we study the price setting problem of a ﬁrm facing both an observation
cost and an adjustment (menu) cost. While the context is diﬀerent the nature of the problem
is similar and the ﬁrm’s frequency of observation and adjustment (i.e. price changes) depend,
as in this paper, on the relative costs of each of these actions. Using data on price-reviews
and price-changes from a sample of European ﬁrms we ﬁnd that large observation costs and
small menu costs are more appropriate to account for the price-review and price-adjustment
frequencies, opposite to the investors’ data. This is due to a smaller observation frequency
(about 2 times per year) and a smaller gap between the frequency of price-review and that
of price-adjustment (the ratio of adjustments to observations is about 1/2). We see these
ﬁndings as reasonable: the observation cost for the investor involves a rather simple task,
namely checking the value of her portfolio. Instead, the observation cost for ﬁrms is plausibly
larger, as it involves ﬁnding out the value of marginal cost or the demand curve. Also the
adjustment cost for ﬁrms, the menu cost, is likely small compared with the typically large
costs involved in the buying (and selling) of durables.
The analysis in this paper assumes that all observations are costly. In the context of
the portfolio and savings model, where several ﬁnancial shocks are likely correlated across
38agents, households might be able to learn the realization of some shocks without paying the
observation cost, a possibility that is not allowed for in our model. In principle, the model
might be extended to allow for the random arrival of some free information, along the lines
of Alvarez and Lippi (2009). Two remarks are in order. First while the risky portfolio in the
model is a single asset, in reality households portfolios are far from perfectly correlated, so
that the “observation” activity may be more involved than the mere reading the heading of
the news. Second, and more importantly, when we confront the model with simple statistics
from the data we ﬁnd that that the implied observation cost is very small: the model without
cost is almost equivalent to that with the calibrated cost. Hence, even without having agents
learning some feature of the value of assets exogenously and without cost we ﬁnd that the
data, as interpreted by our model, points to already extremely small observation cost.
We think that several variations and extensions of the model are worth exploring next. In
particular, our model assumes that assets are the only income source for the investor and that
all consumption is in the form of durable goods. While our empirical analysis concentrated
on a sample of investors, assets are not the only income source for these households.28 Adding
non-durable consumption should be interesting too, partly because it accounts for a large
part of total expenditures, and partly because it is complementary to the use of liquid assets.
We think that fully incorporating labor income and non-durable consumption is interesting
to broaden the applicability of the analysis, but it involves several challenges. Some are
conceptual, such as the modeling the observation of one’s labor income process, others are
technical, such as the proliferation of states in the problem, and ﬁnally other challenges are
empirical, such as locating relevant data sets for the measurement of observation frequencies
and the action that it triggers related to labor income and non-durable consumption.29
On the theoretical side, we also ﬁnd it interesting to study how the decisions rules of
models that combine both state dependent and time dependent type of adjustments aggregate
and how these type of rules aﬀect the response to aggregate shocks. We leave these tasks for
future research.
28That is why we also included data on the share of labor income as control in the empirical analysis.
29See Sims (2003), Reis (2006a) for a model of information gathering about the properties of labor income
and the adjustment of non-durable consumption.
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42A Data sources and variables’ deﬁnitions
A.1 The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) collects detailed data on
demographics, households’ consumption, income, transaction habits and money holdings and
household ﬁnancial and real assets. It started to be run in the mid 1960s but is available on
tape only since 1984. Since 1989 it has been conducted biannually and sampling methodology,
sample size and broad contents of the information collected is unchanged. It is one of the
few household surveys that collects consumption information, separately for non durable
expenditures and purchases of durable categories, together with wealth and income data.
In this study we rely on the 2004 wave which matches closely the 2003 UCS. Each survey
covers about 8,000 households, constituting a representative sample of the Italian resident
population. Sampling is in two stages, ﬁrst municipalities and then households. Households
are randomly selected from registry oﬃce records. Households are deﬁned as groups of
individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption and sharing the same dwelling. The head
of the household is conventionally identiﬁed with the husband, if present. Brandolini and
Cannari (1994) present a detailed discussion of sample design, attrition, response rates and
other measurement issues, and comparisons of the SHIW variables with the corresponding
aggregates. The 2004 wave interviewed 8,012 households with a response rate of 36%. The
SHIW is publicly accessible; an English version of the questionnaire is available and data can
be downloaded at www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait.
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43A.2 The Unicredit Survey (UCS)
The Unicredit Investors Survey (UCS) draws on the population of clients of one of the three
largest European banking groups, with over 4 million accounts in Italy. Two waves of the
survey, which is proprietary, are currently available, the ﬁrst was run in 2003, the second
in 2007. The ﬁrst wave interviewed 1,834 individuals (1,716 the second) with a checking
account in one of the banks that are part of the Unicredit Group based in Italy. The sample
is representative of the eligible population of customers, excluding customers less than 20
years old or older than 80, and those who hold accounts of less than 1,000 euro (less than
10,000 euros in the 2007 wave) or more than 2.5 million euro.
UCS goal is to study retail customers’ ﬁnancial behavior and expectations. The survey
has detailed information on households’ demographic structure, individuals ﬁnancial assets
holding (both within and outside the bank), real wealth components and income. It has
data on attitudes towards saving and ﬁnancial investment, propensity to take ﬁnancial risk,
retirement saving and life insurance as well as data relevant for ﬁnancial decision taking such
as ﬁnancial information activity, ﬁnancial literacy, trading experience and practice, assets
knowledge and conﬁdence in markets. Interviews for the ﬁrst wave have been administered
between September 2003 and January 2004 ( in the ﬁrst half of 2007 for the second wave)
by an Italian leading poll agency, which also serves the Bank of Italy for the Survey on
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Most interviewers had substantial experience in ad-
ministering the Bank of Italy SHIW (see below). The Computer Assisted Personal Interview
(CAPI) methodology was employed for all interviews. Before the interview, each customer
was contacted by phone.
The sampling design is similar to that of the Bank of Italy SHIW. As in SHIW, the
population of account holders is stratiﬁed along geographical area of residence (North-East,
North-West, Central and Southern Italy), city size (less that 30,000 inhabitants and more),
and wealth held with Unicredit (as of December 31, 2003). The use of the same com-
pany to run the ﬁeld and the similar sample design facilitates the comparison between UCS
and SHIW. The questionnaire was designed with the help of ﬁeld experts and academic re-
searchers. It has several sections, dealing with household demographic structure, occupation,
propensity to save, to invest and to risk, ﬁnancial information and literacy, individual and
household ﬁnancial portfolio and investment strategies, real estate, entrepreneurial activities,
income and expectations, life insurance and retirement income. The wealth questions match
those in the Bank of Italy SHIW, which allows interesting comparison between the wealth
distributions in the two surveys.
An important feature of the UCS is that sample selection is based on individual clients
of Unicredit. The survey, however, contains detailed information also on the household head
– deﬁned as the person responsible for the ﬁnancial matters of the family – and spouse, if
present. Financial variables are elicited for both respondents and household.
A.3 UCS assets data and wealth deﬁnition
UCS contains detailed information on ownership of real and ﬁnancial assets, and amounts
invested. Real assets refer to the household. Financial assets refer to both the account
holder and the household. For real assets, UCS reports separate data on primary residence,
44investment real estate, land, business wealth, and debt (mortgage and other debt). Real
asset amounts are elicited without use of bracketing.
Two deﬁnitions of ﬁnancial wealth are available. One refers to the individual account
holder, and the other to the entire household. The two can diﬀer because some customers
keep ﬁnancial wealth also in diﬀerent banks or ﬁnancial institutions (multi-banking) and/or
because diﬀerent household members have diﬀerent accounts. In this study we only rely on
household level variables.
Calculation of ﬁnancial assets amounts requires some imputation. First of all, respon-
dents report ownership of ﬁnancial assets grouped in 10 categories. Respondents are then
asked to report ﬁnancial assets amounts; otherwise, they are asked to report amounts in
16 predetermined brackets and if the stated amount is closer to the upper or lower interval
within each bracket. In the 2003 wave the questions are the same used in the Bank of Italy
SHIW.
A.4 The distribution of ﬁnancial wealth in the UCS and SHIW
survey
Since the UCS sample only includes banked individuals and there is an asset threshold for
participation in the survey, it is no surprise that investors in the two samples are diﬀerent
particularly in terms of average assets holdings. While in the UCS sample people have on
average euros 212,000 (median 56,000) in ﬁnancial assets, the average in SHIW 2004 is only
23,400 (median 7,000). To make a more meaningful comparison between the two dataset we
select SHIW and UCS households so as to include only those with positive investments other
than in transaction accounts but exclude those with ﬁnancial assets greater than 1 million
euros, to try account for the oversampling of the wealthy in UCS.
Figure A-9: Household distribution of wealth in SHIW and UCS
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Figure A-9 shows the distribution of ﬁnancial wealth in the 2003 UCS and the 2004 SHIW;
once the comparison is limited to the sample of investors the shapes of the distribution become
45more similar, though large diﬀerences between the two dataset remain mainly because UCS
is designed to oversample the ﬁnancially wealthy, as can be seen from the thicker probability
mass in the UCS distribution at higher levels of wealth.
A.5 Deﬁnition of variables constructed from survey responses
Attention when buying durables . Response to the question in UCS 2007: “Before making a
purchase involving a relatively large amount of money (such as a car, a washing machine or
furniture), some people tend to visit several shops or dealers in order to compare various prices
and try to get a good balance in terms of price/quality ratio. How does this description ﬁts
your type?” Possible answers are: “Not at all”, “Very little, “Somewhat.”, “Close enough”,
“Very much”. We code these answers with numbers between 1 and 5.
Cash holdings. Only available in SHIW which asks people: “What sum of money do you
usually have in the house to meet normal household needs?”
Number of withdrawals. Only available in SHIW which asks people: “In 2004 how many
cash withdrawals did you or other members of your household make directly at a bank or
Post Oﬃce on average per month?”
Durable consumption purchases. Only available in SHIW which collects information on
purchases of three categories of durables: precious objects, means of transport, and furniture,
furnishings, household appliances and sundry articles, by asking: “During 2004 did you (or
your household) buy ... (item...)? If “Yes, what is the total value of the objects bought (even
if they were not paid for completely)?” Thus, SHIW collects separately whether a purchase
took place and its value.
Financial diversiﬁcation. The ratio of stocks held in mutual funds and other investment
accounts to total stocks (direct plus indirect). The index ranges from 0 to 1.
Liquid assets. We use two measures of liquid assets, a narrow one corresponding roughly
to M1, and a broader one similar to M2. The ﬁrst measure is deﬁned as the sum of average
cash holdings and checking accounts; the broader measure adds to this savings accounts.
Accounts are ﬁgures at the household level and ﬁgures are variables are deﬁned in the same
way in UCS and SHIW. Since UCS has no information on average cash holdings, we impute
it from SHIW 2004. Imputation is done by ﬁrst running a regression on the SHIW sample
(retaining only those with a checking account) of average cash holdings (scaled by house
value) on a number of variable observed also in UCS: a set of demographics, a ﬁfth order
polynomial in income (scaled by house value), a forth order polynomial in age and interactions
between demographics and house value and interactions between income and the polynomial
in age and income and demographics. The regressions explains 64% of the cross sectional
variability. The estimated coeﬃcients are retrieved and used to predict cash holdings in UCS
2003.
Non durable consumption. From the SHIW question: “What was the monthly average
spending of your household in 2004 on all consumer goods, in cash, by means of credit cards,
cheques, ATM cards, etc?. Consider all spending, on both food and non-food consumption,
and exclude only: purchases of precious objects, purchases of cars, purchases of household ap-
pliances and furniture, maintenance payments, extraordinary maintenance of your dwelling,
rent for the dwelling, mortgage payments, life insurance premiums, contributions to private
pension funds”. Answers are multiplied by 12 to obtain an annual ﬁgure. Since non durable
46consumption is not available in UCS, it is imputed using SHIW information. This is done
by ﬁrst running a regression on the SHIW sample (retaining only those with a checking ac-
count) of non durable consumption (scaled by house value) on a number of variable observed
also in UCS: a set of demographics, a ﬁfth order polynomial in income (scaled by house
value), a forth order polynomial in age, interactions between demographics and house value
and interactions between income and the polynomial in age and income and demographics.
The regression explains 91% of the cross sectional variability. The estimated coeﬃcients are
retrieved and used to predict cash holdings in UCS 2003.
Observing frequency. Response to the question: “How frequently do you check the value
of your ﬁnancial investment?” Coded as: every day; at least once a week; about every two
weeks; about every month; about every three months; about every six months; about every
year; less than once a year; never. The number of times (frequency) an investor observes her
investments is computed from the responses as: every day=365; at least once a week=52;
about every two weeks=26; about every month=12; about every three months=4; about every
six months=2; about every year=1; less than once a year=0.36; never=0.10. To impute the
last category we approximate “never” as meaning once every 10 years.
Stockholders. We construct two identiﬁers of stockholders: direct and total. Direct
stockholders are investors owing stocks of single companies, either listed or unlisted. Total
stockholders own stocks either directly or through a mutual fund or a managed investment
account.
Risk aversion. Response to the question in UCS: “Which of the following statements
comes closest to the amount of ﬁnancial risk that you are willing to take when you make
your ﬁnancial investment?: (1) a very high return, with a very high risk of loosing the money;
(2) high return and high risk; (3) moderate return and moderate risk; (4) low return and no
risk.”
Time spent in collecting ﬁnancial information. Response to question: “How much time
do you usually spend, in a week, to acquire information on how to invest your savings? (think
about time reading newspapers, internet, talk to your ﬁnancial advisor, etc.)”. Coded as: no
time; less than 30 minutes; between 30 minutes and 1 hour; 1-2 hours; 2-4 hours; 4-7 hours;
more than 7 hours. The hours per year indicator is constructed by coding: no time=0; less
than 30 minutes=0.25×4×12 = 12 (assuming 15 minutes a week); between 30 minutes and 1
hour=(45/60)×4×12 = 36 (assuming 45 minutes a week; 1-2 hours = (90/60)×4×12 = 72
(assuming 90 minutes a week); 2-4 hours=(180/60)×4×12 = 144 (assuming 3 hours a weak);
4-7 hours=(330/60)×4×12 = 264 (assuming 5 hours and 30 minuets a weak); more than 7
hours (450/60) × 4 × 12 = 360 (assuming 7 hours and 30 minutes a weak).
Trading. Response to question: “How often do you trade ﬁnancial assets (sell or buy
ﬁnancial assets)?” Coded as: every day; at least once a week; about every two weeks; about
every month; about every three months; about every six months; about every year; less than
once a year; at maturity; never. The number of times (frequency) an investor trades her
investments is computed from the responses as: every day=365; at least once a week=52;
about every two weeks=26; about every month=12; about every three months=4; about
every six months=2; about every year=1; less than once a year=0.36; at maturity =0.25;
never=0.10. To impute the last two categories we assume that average maturity is 4 years
and approximate “never” to mean once every 10 years.
47Online Appendices
Durableconsumptionandassetmanagementwith
transactions and observation costs
Fernando Alvarez (U. Chicago)
Luigi Guiso (EUI)
Francesco Lippi (U. Sassari )AA - 2 Special cases
This appendix outlines special cases of the more general problem with both information and
transactions costs described in the text.
AA - 2.1 The frictionless case: φo = φT = 0
The ﬁrst order conditions for the continuous time problem are:
θ : 0 = U
′(θw)w + v
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2 = δ + r + α(µ − r) , (AA-1)








We assume that the utility function is homogenous of degree γ > 0, U(d) = d1−γ
1−γ . In this
case the value function will be homogenous of degree γ too, so we can write it as:
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The foc w.r.t. θ and the Bellman equation can be combined and simplify to:
θ1−γ
v(1)(1 − γ)
= −γ(1 − θ)θα
2σ
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1Equating these two expressions we obtain:
−γ(1 − θ)θα
2σ
2 + θ[δ + r + α(µ − r)]
= ρ − (1 − γ)
 









We are looking for a solution for this equation with θ > 0. This will require some assumptions
on parameters. Among these assumptions, we will include conditions that guarantee that the
problem has a ﬁnite solution. We will consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case α is exogenous, and
the second where α is optimized over. In the ﬁrst case this expression is quadratic equation
in θ. In the second case, where we replace α by its solution found above, θ can be written as
the zero of a higher order polynomial.

















Few comments are in order. First, as δ → ∞, then θ → 0. Second, for γ = 1, the ’log’ case,
the expression for θ = ρ/(δ+r). When γ > 1 this expression is always positive. When γ < 1,
the expression for θ can be negative. It is non-negative if










This conditions ensures that the discount rate ρ is large enough so that utility is bounded
from above.
Coming back to the expression for the value function, replacing the optimal value of α
on the foc for θ derived above we obtain:
v(1) =
θ−γ
(1 − γ)(r + δ)
, (AA-9)
thus, as long as θ as given in (AA-7) is non-negative, which is assured by condition (AA-8),
the problem is well deﬁned.
AA - 2.2 The problem with observation cost only
This appendix derives the ﬁrst order conditions that solve the problem with observation cost
(and no transaction cost).
v(1) =
1 − e−(ρ+(1−γ)δ)τ








(1 − θ) (1 − φo)R(s,τ,α) + θe
−δτ 1−γ
dN(s) (AA-10)

































































The foc with respect to θ gives:
1 − e−(ρ+(1−γ)δ)τ





(1 − φo)R(s,τ,α) − e−δτ
[(1 − θ)(1 − φo)R(s,τ,α) + θe−δτ]
γ dN(s)
(AA-13)
Rewrite eq (AA-10) as
1 − e−(ρ+(1−γ)δ)τ
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γ dN(s) (AA-14)



















Equations (AA-10), (AA-12), (AA-14) and (AA-15) give a system of four equations in
the 4 unknowns v(1), θ, τ and α.
AA - 2.3 The Grossman - Laroque case: φo = 0 and φT > 0
In this appendix we provide more details on the model of Section 4.3 with adjustment cost
only. One diﬀerence compared to the original GL model is that the portfolio share α can
3only be adjusted when the stock of durables is revised (so α becomes a state for the problem,











with equality in the inaction region. The possibility of adjustment gives
V (a,d) ≥ max
a′≥0,α
V (a
′,d(1 − φT) + a − a
′) ,
with equality if adjustment of durables is optimal at that (a,d). The maximization with
respect to the post-adjustment value of a′ gives the foc:
Va(a
′,d(1 − φT) + a − a
′) = Vd(a
′,d(1 − φT) + a − a
′) . (AA-16)





We can write all the conditions jointly as:




























To write this PDE as an ODE, we use homogeneity to express Vd in terms of Va,
Vd(x,1) = (1 − γ)V (x,1) − x Va(x,1)
so that, after replacing into the PDE and collecting terms, gives the following ODE:
(ρ + δ(1 − γ)) V (x,1) =
1
1 − γ







so that the solution for V (x,1) in the inaction range is
V (x,1) =
1






4where the roots ηi solve the characteristic equation
0 = ρ + δ(1 − γ) −
 









The policy rule is characterized by three numbers: the optimal return point ˆ x, and the 2
barriers (x, ¯ x) that delimit the inaction region: an agent with x ∈ (¯ x,x) does not adjust.
Outside this region, i.e. for x ≥ ¯ x or x ≤ x, the value function is characterized by paying the
ﬁxed cost and adjusting so that the post-adjustment ratio is ˆ x.
The closed form solution for the ODE, up to the two constant of integration A1,A2 in the
inaction region allows us to then write a system of 5 equations and unknowns. The unknowns
are A1,A2,x, ¯ x, ˆ x. The ﬁve equations are the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal return point
equation (AA-17), a pair of value matching conditions at each boundary equations (AA-18),
and a pair of smooth pasting conditions at each boundary equations (AA-19):
Va(ˆ x,1) = Vd(ˆ x,1) , (AA-17)
 
1 + ¯ x − φT
1 + ˆ x
 1−γ
V (ˆ x,1) = V (¯ x,1) ,
 
1 + x − φT
1 + ˆ x
 1−γ
V (ˆ x,1) = V (x,1) , (AA-18)
Va(x,1)(1 − φT) = Vd(x,1) , Va(¯ x,1)(1 − φT) = Vd(¯ x,1) . (AA-19)
Equation (AA-17) follows from equation (AA-16). The value matching equations (AA-18)
use that
V (¯ a − ˜ ∆
∗, ¯ d(1 − φT) + ˜ ∆
∗) = max
˜ ∆
V (¯ a − ˜ ∆, ¯ d(1 − φT) + ˜ ∆) = V (¯ a, ¯ d)
1 =
Va(ˆ a, ˆ d)
Vd(ˆ a, ˆ d)
and
¯ a − ˜ ∆∗





¯ x − ˆ x(1 − φT)
1 + ˆ x
where ¯ x = ¯ a/¯ d, ˆ x = ˆ a/ˆ d and ∆∗ = ˜ ∆∗/¯ d, and the homogeneity of degree (1−γ) of V (·). The
same derivation applies in the lower boundary x. To derive the smooth pasting conditions
equations (AA-19) consider pairs (a,d) such that a+d(1−φT)d = ¯ a+ ¯ d(1−φT) = ˆ a+ ˆ d and
that a/d > ¯ a/¯ d for some ﬁxed ¯ a, ¯ d so that after adjustment the agent will go to ˆ a, ˆ d. Notice
that for any such pair (a,d) the agent will also pay the ﬁxed cost and adjust to the same
level ˆ a, ˆ d. Thus we have:
V (a,d) = V (¯ a, ¯ d) = V (ˆ a, ˆ d)
or using a = ¯ a + ¯ d(1 − φT) − d(1 − φT) :
V (¯ a + ¯ d(1 − φT) − d(1 − φT),d) = V (ˆ a, ˆ d)
and diﬀerentiating w.r.t. d we have
0 = −Va(¯ a + ¯ d(1 − φT) − d(1 − φT),d)(1 − φT) + Vd(¯ a + ¯ d(1 − φT) − d(1 − φT),d)
5Taking the limit as d ↑ ¯ d we have
Va(¯ a, ¯ d)(1 − φT) = Vd(¯ a, ¯ d)
and using homogeneity we obtain equation (AA-19). Repeating the same argument for values
of a/d < a/d we obtain the other smooth pasting condition.
For completeness we also describe the expected number of adjustment per unit of time,
given the two barriers ¯ x and x and given the optimal return point ˆ x. Let T(a,d) be the
expected time until an adjustment takes place, starting from state (a,d). We have







with boundaries T(¯ a, ¯ d) = T(a,d) = 0. We are interested in T(ˆ a, ˆ d), which gives the expected
time between successive adjustments. We notice that T is homogeneous of degree zero, and
hence we can write:







with boundaries T(¯ x,1) = T(x,1) = 0. The solution to this equation is
T(x) = B0 + B1x
λ + B2 logx
where
λ = 1 −




α2σ2/2 − (r + α(µ − r) + δ)
.
The constants B0 and B1 are chosen to satisfy the terminal conditions, namely
0 = B0 + B1x
λ + B2 logx , 0 = B0 + B1¯ x




log ¯ x − logx
xλ − ¯ xλ ¯ x
λ + log ¯ x
 
, B1 = B2
log ¯ x − logx
xλ − ¯ xλ .
6AA - 2.4 The Bellman equation when φo > 0,φT > 0
Here we use the homogeneity of the value function V (a,d) to reduce the Bellman equation
to a function of a single variable by setting d = 1.
¯ V (a,1,α) = max
τ

































ˆ V (a,1) = max
τ, α, 0≤a′≤a+1−φT
   τ
0
e


















[a + (1 − φT) − a
′]
1−γ












[a + (1 − φT) − a′]
(1 − φo)e





















[a + (1 − φT) − a′]
(1 − φo)e




With these expressions it is easy to see that inaction is optimal around the optimal return
point. Consider the feasible policy a′ = a, we have that
ˆ V (a,1) = max
τ, α
















< ¯ V (a,1, ˆ α)
where the last inequality follows by the fact that utility is increasing in the stock of durables.
AA - 3 No trade between observations
Notice that between observation dates, with σ > 0, the agent does not know her wealth.
Moreover, there is a strictly positive probability that her wealth can be arbitrarily close to
zero. This precludes the strategy where the agent increases her holding of durables between
7observations dates by withdrawing resources from her ﬁnancial assets, since she may otherwise
violate her budget constraint. Thus, we will only need to consider the case where the agent
is allowed to decrease her durable holding, and increase her holding for ﬁnancial assets in
between observation dates. We will like to show that it is not optimal to decrease durable
goods, and hence that the restriction on the policies is not binding. But to verify this in the
case for σ > 0 is complicated, so we restrict attention to the case with σ = 0. We conjecture
that the conclusion extends to the case of σ > 0.
In particular for σ = 0 we consider the following variational problem taking as given the
interval τ, as well as the initial and ﬁnal wealth w(0),w(τ), and where during the observation
period the agent can sell durables at rate x(t) and invest the proceeds in the ﬁnancial assets








w(0) = a(0) + d(0) , w(τ) = a(τ)(1 − φo) + d(τ),
˙ d(t) = −δd(t) − x(t) , ˙ a(t) = r a(t) + x(t),
a(0),d(0),a(τ),d(τ),x(t) ≥ 0.
Proposition 1. If ρ < r + δγ, then the non-negativity constraint binds, and the optimal
policy is x(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0,τ].
Notice from equation (11) that in the case of φo = 0 and σ = 0 (so µ = r), the solution
of the continuous time problem gives a value for the fraction of wealth in durables θ equal to
θ =
r−(r−ρ)/γ
r+δ . Thus the condition for x(t) = 0 given in the proposition is equivalent to the
condition for θ < 1. This is quite intuitive, for x(t) = 0 we require the return on the ﬁnancial
portfolio to be good relative to the discount rate and the depreciation rate. Moreover, if the
parameters are such that θ < 1, then when φo is small but positive, the agent will still choose
x(t) = 0.
Proof. Let e−ρtλ(t) be the multiplier of the law of motion of a at t, e−ρtµ(t) the multiplier
of the law of motion of d at t, ν0 the multiplier of the wealth at t = 0 constraint, and ν1 the






u(d(t)) + λ(t)(a(t)r + x(t) − ˙ a(t)) + µ(t)
 
−d(t)δ − x(t) − ˙ d(t)
  
dt
+ ν1[(1 − φ)a(τ) + d(τ) − w(τ)] + ν0[w(0) − a(0) − d(0)]






u(d(t)) + λ(t)(a(t)r + x(t) − ρa(t)) + ˙ λ(t)a(t) + µ(t)(−d(t)δ − x(t) − ρd(t)) + ˙ µ(t)d(t)
 
dt
+ν1[(1 − φ)a(τ) + d(τ) − w(τ)] + ν0[w(0) − a(0) − d(0)]
−λ(τ)e
−ρτa(τ) + λ(0)a(0) − µ(τ)e
−ρτd(τ) + µ(0)d(0)
8We can then use the current value Hamiltonian, with state state (d,a) and control x is:
H(a,d,y) = u(d) + µ(−δd − x) + λ(ar + x)
and use µ,λ the costates. The FOC for t ∈ (0,τ) include:
Hx = 0 : −µ(t) + λ(t) ≤ 0
with equality if x(t) > 0, and
˙ λ = ρλ − Ha : ˙ λ(t) = ρλ(t) − λ(t)r
˙ µ = ρµ − Hd : ˙ µ(t) = ρµ(t) − u
′(d(t)) + µ(t)δ
While there are more ﬁrst order conditions involving a(0),d(0),a(τ),d(τ) the previous ones
suﬃce for our current purpose. By way of contradiction, assume x(t) > 0 in an interval
between 0 < t0 and t1 < τ. Then λ = µ and ˙ λ/λ = ρ − r in this interval:
u
′(d(t)) = λ(δ + r) = (δ + r) λ(t0) e
(ρ−r)t












ρ < r + δγ
we arrive to a contradiction with x(t) > 0 on [t0t1].
9